Hamas announced the "election" of Khalil al-Hayya, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, as head of its political bureau — without disclosing where the vote was held. The Arab press found out: in Turkey. That is also where the new political bureau will convene.

Turkey is the story here, not the identity of the winner.

No one has seen how this secret electoral process actually operates, which makes it reasonable to conclude that there were no real elections at all, but rather a political process steered by Qatar and Turkey — following the success of the Cairo talks led by Nickolay Mladenov, the representative of the "Board of Peace." Al Jazeera reported that al-Hayya beat Mashal by a single vote. This is what an engineered ballot looks like. Al-Hayya won, and Mashal did not lose.

It has been said that the delay in choosing Hamas's next leader stemmed from the leadership's inability to decide, but it is more plausible that this breakthrough followed a breakthrough elsewhere — in the Cairo talks on the "day after." The advance signs were Hamas's announcement that it was dissolving its emergency committee, a sort of "government," and handing the administration over to the technocratic committee headed by Ali Shaath. And incidentally, Shaath was appointed by the mediators — the Qataris, the Egyptians and the Turks. Ankara already sits at the table that determines who will run Gaza.

But the clearest signal came from the direction of PA  leader, Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas), when he announced general elections for the Legislative Council immediately after the elections in Israel. Abu Mazen could not remain indifferent to the progress in Gaza, and signaled that he is the one holding the legitimacy for the "day after."

Having removed the barrier of recognition of the Oslo Accords, at Hamas's demand, he opened the gate for the terrorist organization to enter the West Bank through general elections. This is in effect the formula being put to Hamas for relinquishing its weapons — dismantle the heavy weapons, the missiles and the rockets, allow the general elections to proceed, and Hamas will be preserved as a political party rather than an armed organization. In Kushner's presentation and in the draft that was reported, the work of Witkoff, Kushner and Mladenov, the distinction is clear: heavy weapons — immediate dismantling; personal weapons — registration and gradual decommissioning.

And this formula is not for Gaza only. It is the Lebanese model: what is offered to Hezbollah is offered to Hamas as well — surrendering the heavy weapons in exchange for preserving the political framework. And not only that. The Lebanese arrangement is also the model for Israel's withdrawal from Gaza: phased withdrawal against phased disarmament, under international supervision.

It is telling that Hamas did not reject Abu Mazen's call for elections out of hand; instead, it now demands to be a partner in the electoral process. The Hamas website made clear that the process Abu Mazen proposes deepens the rift between the West Bank and Gaza — and the impression arises that Hamas in fact wants this rift, and that it wants to keep Gaza for the Gazans. That includes the division within Hamas itself, and it explains the core of the dispute between al-Hayya and Mashal.

Al-Hayya's election is consistent with the character of the leadership being assembled for Gaza — Gaza for the Gazans. All the Cairo contacts involved Gazans only. Ramallah was pushed aside, and those who represented Fatah were Dahlan men and those of Hamas, only Hamas Gaza- not Mashal’s personnel. Ramallah's demand for representation in the bodies being established for Gaza was rejected. The "Ramallah people" selected for Shaath's committee were Gazans who moved to Ramallah after Hamas's 2007 coup, and who will now return to where they came from.

Hence Khaled Mashal could not have been elected at this moment, when the "day after" in Gaza stands at the center. Mashal is from the West Bank, born in Silwad near Ramallah, and is therefore unsuited to lead Gaza.

The report of a razor-thin margin is itself part of the engineering — a one-vote gap leaves each of them his standing.

And in truth — in whatever position he holds, Khaled Mashal is the real leader of Hamas, because he is the closest to the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad. His leadership illuminates a corner that we in Israel ignore: Hamas is far more than Gaza. Within the frameworks of the Muslim Brotherhood it is a regional movement, with a strong presence in Europe as well. Battered, ruined Gaza has lost its standing as the movement's center of gravity. Al-Hayya will be the leader of battered Gaza; Mashal, by virtue of his seniority in Doha, remains the one who runs Hamas across the region. It was Mashal, in my assessment, who opened Syria's doors to Abu Mohammad al-Julani, today Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the rest is known. Now Jordan and Egypt watch him with concern, lest he do to them what he did to Syria.

And this is where Turkey enters. Ankara wants, by way of the Gaza arrangements, to get into the ruined city, to take the reconstruction profits — and the port. It was reported to have already prepared a brigade of some two thousand soldiers for the stabilization force; Israel imposed a veto, and Netanyahu declared from the Knesset podium that "Turkish and Qatari soldiers will not be in the Strip." So, Ankara goes around: it hosts the political bureau, it appoints the technocrats, and it is the one that hosted the vote itself. Two channels in parallel — al-Hayya on the ground, Mashal in the regional arena, and both of them run through Ankara.

And while this model takes shape, Israel is doing precisely the opposite. The Associated Press revealed this week, on the basis of satellite imagery, that it is building an enormous earthen barrier along the Yellow Line — more than 23 kilometers erected since February, with construction still under way. The Yellow Line was meant to be a temporary division pending a full withdrawal; an earthen wall dozens of kilometers long is not temporary. Israel is entrenching the partition of Gaza instead of withdrawing from it.

While Israel builds earthen berms, Ankara is putting down roots.

The implications are far-reaching: a Turkish stake driven into the eastern Mediterranean basin, and the spoiling of the natural alliance of Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt.

In Israel they talk about the danger of al-Hayya's ties with Iran. The real danger sits in Ankara — and about that there is no discussion. Israeli government? They do not care less.  

In sum: the "election" of Khalil al-Hayya was a natural step in the "Gaza for the Gazans" chain of the Cairo talks. It did not damage the standing of Khaled Mashal, who was and remains the real leader of Hamas beyond Gaza — and it is he who will advance Turkey into Gaza, as he advanced it in Syria.