Israel Time

At El Alamein, Egypt, near the Libyan border, brought lately a turning point in the Palestinian arena. A Palestinian Authority delegation led by Hussein al-Sheikh, Mahmoud Abbas's deputy, met with a delegation representing Mohammed Dahlan, headed by Samir Mashharawi — after many years of estrangement and mutual recrimination.

Before describing the meeting and what it means, a red flag needs to be raised over the name Samir Mashharawi himself. Israel must state plainly that the man is unacceptable to it, after he described the October 7 massacre around Gaza as “a miracle that smeared Israel's face in the mud,” and portrayed it as a source of pride for the Palestinian people and a permanent stain on the occupation.

According to Arab press reports, this week's meeting produced no concrete results, but its significance lies not only in the fact that it took place at all, but in the fact that it happened against the wishes — and perhaps even the objection — of the head of the Palestinian Authority, Abu Mazen (Abbas).

The name Samir Mashharawi, who met with Abu Mazen's people, should raise a red flag for Israel: he described the October 7 massacre around Gaza as “a miracle that smeared Israel's face in the mud,” and portrayed it as a source of pride for the Palestinian people.

To understand this, one has to look inside the Fatah movement, which is refusing to accept the outcome of its last gathering — the Eighth General Conference, held on May 14, 2026, in Ramallah, the first such conference in about a decade. Above all, Fatah is refusing to accept the blunt attempt to crown Yasser, Abu Mazen's son, as the movement's next leader. In other words: the war of succession has now opened officially, with Hussein al-Sheikh directly threatened by Abu Mazen, who is seeking to remove him as the presumed heir.

Opposition to Yasser Abbas extends to many others in the Fatah leadership, including figures who were very close to Abu Mazen right up until the conference. One of them, Jibril Rajoub, has openly challenged Abu Mazen's presidential decree, demanding that presidential elections be held before elections to the legislative council. That demand quickly swept up most of the veteran Fatah leadership behind it. What it amounts to is a call for Abu Mazen's removal — and the prevailing mood in the Fatah leadership today is that the Abu Mazen era is over.

Against that backdrop, Hussein al-Sheikh's meeting with Dahlan's people can be understood as a joining of forces for the day after Abu Mazen — a day that would be reached through elections.

When we talk about elections, the spotlight has to shift to Europe and the Arab states. These two key players are demanding that Abu Mazen carry out deep reform within the Palestinian Authority, in order to qualify it as a legitimate actor for the day after in Gaza. According to sources within Fatah, neither Europe nor the Arab states — chiefly Saudi Arabia and Jordan — regard crowning Yasser Abbas as heir as a response to the reforms needed to qualify the Authority as a relevant actor for the day after. To date, Europe has not transferred to Ramallah the funds needed to hold elections, and there is, as of now, no practical preparation under way for holding them at all.

The prevailing mood in the Fatah leadership today is that the Abu Mazen era is over. Against that backdrop, Hussein al-Sheikh's meeting with Dahlan's people can be understood as a joining of forces for the day after Abu Mazen — a day to be reached through elections.

Sources in Ramallah say it is already clear to everyone that elections in Gaza are simply not possible, and that elections held only in the West Bank would only entrench the split between Gaza and the West Bank. Every move underway in Gaza today follows the logic of “Gaza for the Gazans,” much to the displeasure of Egypt, which insists on reconnecting Gaza to the West Bank, as a counterweight to Israel's declared policy of transferring Gazans to Egypt.

From this it follows that the El Alamein meeting most likely had Egyptian blessing, and the question now is whether a meeting will take place between the Egyptians and Hussein al-Sheikh, aimed at positioning him as Abu Mazen's heir in place of Yasser Abbas. Egyptian sources have told me in the past that Abdel Fattah el-Sisi himself has described Abu Mazen as “stubborn,” and it should be assumed the Egyptians will be careful not to provoke Abu Mazen's anger by holding a formal meeting with al-Sheikh.

The El Alamein meeting most likely had Egyptian blessing, and the question now is whether a meeting will take place between the Egyptians and Hussein al-Sheikh, aimed at positioning him as Abu Mazen's heir in place of Yasser Abbas, Abu Mazen's son.

In any case, in place of elections to the Palestinian Authority — which, given today's situation, cannot be held — Abu Mazen's original proposal has resurfaced: holding “elections” to the PLO's National Council, rather than to the Authority's Legislative Council (the PLC). I put “elections” in quotation marks because the PLO's tradition is one of appointments, not genuine elections — especially given the state of the Arab world: the refugee camps in Syria are under Russian influence and Ahmad al-Sharaa's regime is anti-Palestinian; in Lebanon, President Joseph Aoun wants to strip the militias of their weapons and will not allow the PLO to rebuild there; and as for Jordan — there is nothing to discuss — it will not permit any participation by Palestinians in Jordan in a PLO event.

So even convening the Palestinian National Council would not be an act of “reform,” but rather a renewed reconciliation between Dahlan's people and Fatah aimed at agreeing on a joint slate of candidates — and this, too, must wait for the day after Abu Mazen.

While Dahlan's return to Fatah's ranks is still in its infancy, his reconciliation with Hamas has already passed the point of no return — if there is any concept of “no return” at all in the shifting sands of the Middle East. Not just Hamas, but all of Gaza's terror organizations, including Islamic Jihad, and without the Fatah-affiliated clans still fighting Hamas, such as the Hilles clan.

This requires us to look at Gaza and examine what is really driving Hamas right now. Israel is alarmed by the kite-flying displays, and there is room for concern, but conversations with Gazans inside Gaza paint a different picture — one that may better explain what is truly driving Hamas.

It is true that Hamas is presenting itself as having restored and renewed its recruitment, and this needs to be watched closely. But from what is heard out of Gaza, Hamas has lost control over the population. There is no governing authority in Gaza, and it is every man against his brother.

One has to look at Gaza and examine what is really driving Hamas right now. Israel is alarmed by the kite-flying displays, and there is room for concern — but conversations with Gazans inside Gaza paint a picture that may better explain what is truly driving Hamas: it has lost control over the population.

Inside this vacuum of authority, criminal gangs are growing stronger, clans are organizing around themselves, and a sense of despair and personal loss is intensifying — along with it, personal and national trauma.

It is no accident that Hamas dissolved its committee that had functioned as a kind of government: it lacks the capacity to govern, and the committee had only become a lightning rod for frustration. Hamas wants the Board of Peace to step in, so as to free itself of a responsibility for the population that it is simply unable to bear.

Hamas is proposing to consolidate all heavy weapons in closed depots under the Board of Peace's authority. Were Israel to have a serious government rather than one built on talking points, it ought to welcome a proposal under which Hamas itself collects the heavy weapons — rather than IDF soldiers paying for it in blood, and with no certainty the weapons would even be collected. If the arrangements collapse, the IDF will know where the weapons are stored, and can destroy them. As for collecting personal weapons — that is simply not possible given the state of anarchy, and given Hamas's own need for its men to defend themselves against the fury of ordinary Gazans.

Like Abu Mazen, Israel too is not a relevant party to the arrangements for Gaza, and like Abu Mazen, Israel too is being asked for “reform” — reform that is waiting on the results of an election. So the “day after” that the world is waiting for is also a day of reform in Israel after its own elections, and of reform in the West Bank that will only take effect the day after Abu Mazen.

About the author

Pinhas Inbari is a senior Middle East researcher, journalist, author, screenwriter, and poet. He wrote the entries on the Palestinians for the New Hebrew Encyclopedia and spent many years as a researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He has written nonfiction books on the Palestinian problem and a linguistics book on the roots of the Hebrew language, “Sipur Shoresh” (“Root Story”). The novels he co-wrote with his wife, Aviva, are “On the Back of a Storm,” about the Christian communities of the Western Galilee during the British Mandate confronting radical Islam and the status of women, and “Shomer HaShe'ol” (“Keeper of the Underworld”), which deals with corruption in Israel.