The danger Israel faces from the Lebanese arrangements is not primarily military — it is political. And it may yet cost Israel its place as America's principal regional partner.

By Pinhas Inbari | Translated from Zman Yisrael (Israel Time)

The greatest strategic danger Israel faces from the Lebanese arrangements is not military. It is political.

The processes now unfolding in the Land of the Cedars carry within them the potential to replace Israel with Iran as America's principal regional ally — upending the entire architecture of relationships Israel has long relied upon.

That may sound far-fetched, bordering on fantasy or nightmare. But history supplies a precedent that demands attention: Iran has already served as a primary partner of the United States — not once, but twice.

The processes now unfolding in Lebanon carry the potential to replace Israel with Iran as America's principal regional ally — upending every architecture Israel has relied upon.

The Afghan and Iraqi Precedent

In Afghanistan, Iran surprised Washington by offering indirect assistance in the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. That cooperation took root and migrated to Iraq, where American and Iranian interests converged to the point that the two powers jointly installed the Shia prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. The arrangement was subsequently extended to the campaign against the Islamic State — and, less publicly reported, against Kurdish aspirations for autonomy.

Israel was party to none of these arrangements. It stood outside the framework woven between Washington and Tehran in Afghanistan and Iraq. But those patterns of cooperation are now bleeding into Lebanon — and this time, Israel is not a bystander. It is an active party to the conflict, and its conduct will determine whether it is perceived as an asset or a liability in whatever regional order emerges.

How Did We Get Here?

Israel has a well-worn habit of blaming everyone else for its own failures. But until it honestly accounts for its own share of the breakdown, the damage will only compound. The deeper problem is structural: the chronic instability of American foreign policy. This is not an Israeli problem alone — every U.S. ally in the region suffers from it.

The process began with President Barack Obama, who abandoned traditional partnerships in favor of Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood. President Donald Trump has now demonstrated that Obama was not an anomaly — he was the preview of things to come.

In Iraq, American and Iranian interests converged to the point that the two powers jointly installed the Shia prime minister al-Maliki. Those patterns of cooperation are now bleeding into Lebanon.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu identified the problem long ago and proposed his solution: a Spartan Israel, self-reliant and confident in the force of its own arms — one that needs no regional partners. This is precisely the wrong answer. What Israel needs is the opposite: a web of regional alliances that reduces its dependence on Washington. The irony is that this is exactly what every American administration has asked of Israel: integration into an Israeli-Sunni bloc, with Israel and Saudi Arabia as co-anchors.

The Kahanist Government's Veto on Strategy

That alliance — Israel's supreme national interest — collided head-on with the messianic nationalism of the current government. Washington sought to position Israel as a co-leader of the Middle East alongside Saudi Arabia. The Israeli government preferred to remain a violent, self-enclosed ghetto. The result: Israel has become a toxic asset that no one wishes to touch.

It is no accident that Lebanon became the turning point. At the juncture between the end of the Iran war and the first stirrings of Trump's "Vision of Peace" — with Israeli-Lebanese security talks on the threshold of the Joseph Aoun presidency — Israel bombed the Dahieh. Trump warned. Israel bombed again, on the eve of the next negotiating round. Trump confined Israel to southern Lebanon alone, and to defensive operations only.

And that is how we became ducks in a shooting gallery. We applied unnecessary force precisely where we should have given Trump the opening to move from the Iran war toward a regional peace.

Netanyahu proposed a Spartan Israel, self-reliant and confident in the force of its own arms — one that needs no regional partners. This is precisely the wrong answer.

The Nabatieh Card — A Fact-Check

Israel's new strategic asset in Lebanon is its control over the Nabatieh plateau and the Ali Taher ridge that overlooks the city. To understand why Iran regards a threat to Nabatieh as equivalent to a threat to the Strait of Hormuz, one must understand what Nabatieh actually is.

Nabatieh is the administrative, economic, and symbolic heart of the Shia south. It is the principal city of the Jabal Amel region — a landscape of deep-rooted Shia civilization that predates the Lebanese state, extending across southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and the Galilee.

Scholars and analysts describe Nabatieh as the "cradle of Lebanese Shiism," with dense institutional ties to the religious seminaries of Najaf and Qom, and a broad network of Shia jurisprudential authority (marjaiya).

A retired Lebanese general has called the Ali Taher ridge "the mother of battles" for Nabatieh. Whoever holds the ridge controls the supply axis, aerial observation over the Zahrani corridor, and the operational depth of Hezbollah in the south.

The IDF's current "yellow line" runs through the southern Nabatieh plateau to the sea — meaning the plateau itself lies within Israel's declared security zone. Evacuation orders for the city of Nabatieh were issued at the end of May 2026; the city has been effectively emptied of its residents. IDF forces remain in place as Israel refuses to withdraw until Hezbollah is disarmed.

Iran regards a threat to Nabatieh — the administrative, economic, and symbolic heart of the Shia south — as equivalent to a threat to the Strait of Hormuz.

The Lebanese-Iranian Paradox

Lebanese public opinion is a factor consistently neglected in regional analysis. The Lebanese themselves — including broad swaths of the Shia community — are not enthusiastic about Iran formally entrenching itself on their soil. That anxiety creates a shared interest between Lebanon and Israel. The United States is resuming security talks between the two states, as both share a similar apprehension about the trajectory of Iranian penetration.

The scenario that could theoretically develop — a phased IDF withdrawal allowing the Lebanese Army to fill the vacuum in the south, with quiet Saudi backing — remains improbable. Not only because the Lebanese Army is incapable of confronting Hezbollah, but because Netanyahu cannot tell Bezalel Smotrich and his nationalist right that there will be no settlements in southern Lebanon.

What is possible, perhaps, is the creation of a foundation: security trust between Israel and Lebanon that might enable — in time, with Saudi Arabia's quiet support from the wings — coordinated action against Hezbollah strongholds in Nabatieh and the Bekaa Valley. With the United States: preferable. Without it: perhaps necessary.

The Coming Test

The regional anxiety over an American-Iranian rapprochement is, paradoxically, the raw material for renewing regional partnership. States that fear a Washington-Tehran axis are searching for an alternative — and Israel could be part of the solution, if it proves a reliable partner. But the ghetto government, committed to isolation and provocation, will choose the opposite: escalation against Washington, estrangement from the regional alliance.

The deeper danger is that the current government will do exactly the wrong thing. Smotrich's accelerating annexation moves in the West Bank — potentially culminating in a formal annexation declaration — are designed to dominate the political narrative ahead of elections and to bury the memory of the October 7 massacre.

States that fear a Washington-Tehran axis are searching for an alternative. Israel could be part of the solution — if it proves a reliable partner. The ghetto government will choose the opposite.

Netanyahu is thinking about his campaign. What does it matter to him if provocations in the West Bank — and heaven forbid, Itamar Ben Gvir's provocations on the Temple Mount — ignite a storm that dismantles the Abraham Accords and infuriates Trump to the point of slamming shut the door to normalization with Saudi Arabia.

Pinhas Inbari is a veteran Israeli journalist and Middle East analyst writing for Zman Yisrael.