To understand the latest developments in the war against Iran, one must pay close attention to a revealing statement by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian: “The Revolutionary Guards have taken the reins.” In other words, the war is no longer being managed by the state — but by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

If that assessment is correct, the prospects for ending the conflict through a negotiated agreement have dramatically diminished. Reports of potential backchannel contacts between Iran and the United States aimed at ending the war — possibly even through an agreed restructuring of the regime — are directly challenged by Iran’s recent escalation. The message from the IRGC appears unmistakable: no agreement will be permitted if it comes at their expense — or perhaps no agreement at all.

A spokesman for Khatam al-Anbiya, a leading Revolutionary establishment, declared that Iran would “never kneel before the United States,” adding that recent strikes eliminating senior leadership had not impaired the regime’s military capabilities.

This dynamic may also help explain why Iran lacks a credible conventional army or air force. The Revolutionary Guards have long ensured that no fully institutional “state” military could rival their power — and certainly no independent air force capable of staging a coup. For Israelis, this may echo Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s assertion that one cannot govern without a government — but one can manage without air squadrons.

Arabs vs. Persians: The Shiite Divide

When the Revolutionary Guards defend themselves rather than the Iranian state, a deeper fissure emerges within Shiism — one that Iran’s adversaries may seek to widen. The IRGC leadership is overwhelmingly Persian, while Iran’s regional allies are largely Arab — particularly in Iraq and Lebanon.

In Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest religious authority among Iraqi Shiites, issued a formal condolence message acknowledging Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s role. Yet the tone was measured and institutional, calling on the Iranian people to preserve unity — not to seek revenge.

Muqtada al-Sadr expressed “sorrow and grief” in a brief statement. The Iraqi government declared three days of mourning. Although protests erupted in Baghdad — including an attempted breach of the Green Zone — the overall reaction from Iraq’s Shiite establishment was notably restrained relative to the scale of events.

Arab–Persian tensions within Shiism are not new. In Iraq, Arab merchant classes in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala have long resented Iranian dominance over pilgrimage-related commerce. A telling episode occurred when Iran declared a boycott of the Hajj to Mecca; large Arab delegations from Najaf and Karbala deliberately travelled to Mecca in defiance, signalling that Arab identity superseded Persian political directives.

The core Shiite holy cities — Najaf and Karbala — lie in the Arab world. Qom, Iran’s clerical center, is primarily an academic hub rather than a sacred shrine city. Many Arab Shiites quietly ask: why should they, as custodians of Shiism’s holiest sites, defer to Persian leadership whose authority is grounded more in politics than in traditional religious scholarship?

This question sharpens when comparing Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani — widely regarded as the most senior marjai’yya (source of authority) in Shiite Islam — with Ayatollah Khamenei, whose religious credentials are often viewed as secondary to his political authority. Najaf represents a traditionally quietist and scholarly marjai’yya; Tehran embodies a politicized, state-centered model of clerical rule.

Saudi Arabia has already begun to maneuver within this opening. Muqtada al-Sadr, Iraq’s leading Shiite populist figure, appears closer to Riyadh than to Tehran. He visited Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2017 after more than a decade of frozen ties and has repeatedly called for dismantling Iranian-backed militias and removing foreign forces from Iraq. In 2024, he rebranded his movement as the “Patriotic Shiite Current,” positioning himself as a credible Arab partner for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Lebanon: Hezbollah Enters the War Against the State’s Will

The Shiite rupture is equally visible in Lebanon.

On the night of March 1–2, Hezbollah launched rockets and armed drones toward northern Israel, claiming the attack as retaliation “for the blood of the Supreme Leader of the Muslims.” It marked Hezbollah’s first strike on Israel since the November 2024 ceasefire and its first direct participation alongside Iran after having abstained during the brief June 2025 confrontation.

This action occurred in explicit defiance of the Lebanese state — including prominent Shiite state figures. Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal movement and Speaker of Parliament, warned Hezbollah against entering the war. President Joseph Aoun declared that decisions of war and peace rest solely with the Lebanese state. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam labeled Hezbollah’s move “irresponsible,” arguing it endangered Lebanon’s security and provided Israel justification for further strikes. He later called for Hezbollah’s military activities to be outlawed.

Even within Hezbollah’s own historical ranks, dissent exists. Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, one of the organization’s first secretaries-general (1989–1991), has long argued that Lebanese Shiites are Arabs first and must not serve Iranian interests. Expelled from Hezbollah in 1998, he remains a sharp critic of the movement’s subordination to Tehran.