Zman Yisrael (Israel Time)

By Pinhas Inbari

Perhaps the most significant behind-the-scenes development in Lebanon is the visit of Ali Hassan Khalil — aide to the leader of the Shiite Amal movement — to Jeddah for talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

In the wake of those talks, a Saudi statement was issued expressing gratitude to Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Shiite leader Nabih Berri for their role in securing the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel.

Lebanese media noted that Saudi Arabia prefers the term hudna (truce) over “peace” — preserving caution in its approach toward Israel.

Whereas Saudi Arabia had previously conditioned its involvement in Lebanon on Hezbollah’s disarmament, it is now plunging into the thick of it — steering toward a truce process with Israel — in preparation for a broader effort to transform the Shiite terror organization into an unarmed political party.

The sour reception these developments are receiving in Israel is not hard to detect. Yet from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s perspective, his ability to push through measures his own government does not want demonstrates to US President Donald Trump that the investment in him is yielding results. Were he in opposition, a government led by Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennett, or Gadi Eisenkot could not advance on this path without Netanyahu himself blocking it. Netanyahu is the only one capable of implementing Trump’s decisions without the opposition being able to stop him — and even a government of the hard right swallows its tongue.

Notably, it is actually the Lebanese government and President Joseph Aoun who speak of “peace,” while Saudi Arabia speaks of a hudna — a term that goes beyond a ceasefire, but falls short of peace.

There are several plausible reasons for this. First, at this stage Saudi Arabia wants to pry the Shiite Amal movement away from Hezbollah — to draw Amal out of Iran’s orbit while leaving Hezbollah alone under Tehran’s wing. Even within Hezbollah itself, voices are being heard that question the bond with Iran and call for integration into Shiite Arab identity — without the Persians.

If the immediate goal is to fracture the Shiite camp, it is too early to talk about “peace.” Train the child according to his path. Talk of peace will drive Amal back toward Hezbollah at precisely the moment the aim is to separate them.

Second, Saudi Arabia understands that talk of peace between Lebanon and Israel would compel it to take a position on normalization with Israel as well — and as long as Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich are the lords of the current government, Riyadh will keep its distance from any such arrangement.

This does not mean Saudi Arabia will not cooperate with Israel against Iran — I will expand on that in a separate piece. But on Lebanon specifically, Saudi Arabia is entering the fray — and doing so precisely through the Shiite door. That is a wise decision.

Hezbollah: The Looming Threat to Any Truce

On Hezbollah: it remains the greatest threat to any truce process between Lebanon and Israel, even in the narrower Saudi formulation. Yet even Hezbollah’s leader, Naim Qassem, stopped short of branding the Lebanese officials who met with Ambassador Yechiel Leiter in Washington as traitors. That represents a shift in the dialectic previously employed.

In his latest speech, Qassem paid respect to President Aoun, laid out his objections from his own vantage point, proceeded to threaten fitna — civil war — but did not utter the lethal word: treason.

This should not reassure us that Hezbollah will not attempt to assassinate the president. The danger is real.

Bashir Jumayyel, once designated for Lebanon’s presidency, was assassinated by Syrian agents for being defined as a traitor. As he approached the presidency, a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon had been prepared — one at odds with the prevailing mood in Lebanon at the time. Jumayyel himself did not want the agreement, which had been imposed upon him by then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin. His elimination was only a matter of time.

It is worth noting that in his major speech, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General also addressed Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states — and welcomed Saudi involvement, but not in order to encourage reconciliation with Israel. Rather, to unite forces against it.

Yet contrary to Naim Qassem’s expectations, the mood in Lebanon runs in the opposite direction. There is public support for arrangements with Israel. Saudi Arabia is tempering expectations — not “peace” but a hudna — but what matters is that it is entering the Lebanese cauldron with the aim of taking Iran’s place.

Whereas the assassination of Bashir Jumayyel was welcomed in Lebanon, today the fear of the president’s assassination unites all non-Shiite communities. That is a fundamental shift — one that on the one hand may protect the courageous president, but on the other, precisely for that reason, may provide Iran with the motivation to eliminate him through its Shiite proxies.

The Syrian Flank and the Endgame

Saudi Arabia’s entry through Amal’s Shiite door isolates Hezbollah. The real threat to Hezbollah at present comes from the Syrian side of the border: Ahmad al-Shara’s regime is laden with revenge over Hezbollah’s role in suppressing the Sunni uprising alongside Bashar al-Assad.

Paradoxically, the danger of Sunni militias infiltrating Hezbollah’s strongholds in the Bekaa Valley is an additional factor driving Saudi Arabia to engage in earnest. No one wants the successors of ISIS to further complicate an already complicated Lebanese situation.

If the goal is truly to disarm Hezbollah, it will not be achieved at the Litani River — it will have to be achieved at Baalbek. Reaching the Litani was never intended as a decisive victory; it was designed to provide Netanyahu with a victory image. Peace with Lebanon is meant to give Israel the legitimacy to arrive with boots on the ground in the Bekaa Valley — to uproot Hezbollah from its strongholds.

Contrary to Naim Qassem’s expectations, the mood in Lebanon runs the other way. There is public support for arrangements with Israel. Saudi Arabia is tempering expectations — not “peace” but a hudna — but what matters is that it is entering the Lebanese cauldron with the aim of taking Iran’s place.

Ultimately, if Hezbollah’s isolation and the threat from the Syrian side fail to compel it to join Amal in a process of transitioning Lebanon into the Saudi sphere of influence — the IDF will have to reach its strongholds to disarm it, with the blessing of the Lebanese government and Saudi Arabia. And victory in the longest war in the state’s history will be the fruit of a regional process with Saudi Arabia — one that will bring Israel both peace and security with the Land of Cedars.

Pinhas Inbari is a senior Israeli journalist and analyst specializing in Middle Eastern affairs.