Translate from Israel Time

President Trump's envoy Steve Witkoff is returning to Israel to launch Phase Two of the Trump plan, with Israel being pushed from its position of primacy in shaping the next phase in favor of Turkey—though it's unclear whether Israel is even aware of its diminished status. Minister Eli Cohen, for instance, declared with certainty that Hamas terrorists will not emerge from the tunnels, while the grandmizer Smotrich determined that they will die.

Had they waited a bit longer, they would have discovered that the return of Hadar Goldin to Israel was merely part of a deal with Hamas, led by Turkey, which is gradually replacing Israel as the United States' primary ally in the Middle East.

Suddenly everyone is surprised—and horrified—at how it happened "suddenly" that instead of "destroying Hamas," we got an upgraded Hamas with Turkey in Gaza on our southern border. There's nothing to be surprised about—it could have been anticipated at least a year ago that Israel's policy in Gaza would inevitably bring us Erdoğan.

Those who went to bed with Qatar shouldn't be surprised when they wake up with Turkey. And another puzzle: from where did Turkish influence enter Gaza? From Israel! Not from Egypt.

The key point is Rafah and the Rafah Crossing. As soon as the war broke out, aid convoys from the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt entered Rafah and began establishing their own aid mechanism, which was supposed to be the nucleus of a governance alternative to Hamas rule in the north. Like Idlib, from this enclave, the alternative governance was supposed to move northward and replace Hamas with a regime supported by the Abraham Accords.

But then "total victory" jumped on us, the Rafah Crossing was closed, the "Abraham Accords" were expelled from Rafah, the crossing was closed, and Qatar remained the only entity with Arab influence in Gaza. Moreover, when stormy demonstrations by Gazans against Hamas began, Israel initiated "Chariots of Gideon" and put an end to those demonstrations. Hamas remained the sole landlord in Gaza, without competitors, and Qatar the sole aid provider without competitors.

One of the suspicions being investigated in the Qatargate affair involves allegedly fake reports about Egyptian plots against Israel, stoking a war atmosphere between Egypt and Israel, and the continued smuggling of military equipment from Sinai to Israel that never existed, allegedly part of a Qatari consciousness campaign against Egypt through the Prime Minister's Office.

It turns out that Israel continues to view Egypt as an enemy, and this is one of the problems in advancing Phase Two. This relates to the delay in the gas agreement between Israel and Egypt, which is supposed to bring tens of billions of dollars into Israel's coffers. But according to Arab media reports, Israel is jeopardizing the strategic agreement, not only from the aspect of significant revenues but also in terms of expanding the search for additional gas off Israel's coast—all to pressure Egypt politically.

So what's the problem between Egypt and Israel in Phase Two? The link between resolving Gaza and the Palestinian state, and in the immediate context, placing Palestinian Authority-affiliated personnel at the Rafah Crossing, which Israel is delaying opening—possibly to delay Egypt's entry into Gaza.

It's not just the Rafah Crossing that's at issue, but the entire Rafah area, as the Archimedean point of Phase Two is Rafah.

Among the partners in the moves, there's no consensus regarding the Rafah area. Israel wants to keep it under its control to establish settlements there. The Trump-Blair Peace Council wants to establish there—together with Abraham Accords countries—a model alternative regime to Hamas that, like Idlib in Syria, will advance northward until it replaces all of Hamas. Egypt opposes dividing Gaza between Israel and Hamas to link Gaza with the West Bank, and also opposes the Trump-Blair Peace Council because of the insult to Arab nationalism, but it's swallowing that insult at this stage. Its solution is the Gazan Experts Committee, ostensibly disconnected from Hamas but with Hamas's consent. Abu Mazen opposed this committee because he saw it as undermining the Authority's exclusivity over Gaza, but Hussein al-Sheikh in talks held in Cairo with Hamas agreed to it, in exchange for Hamas's consent that the head of the Experts Committee be a Gazan who will receive the title of minister in the Ramallah government.

The question of Hamas's weapons also remains open, with Hamas's position being that it's willing to hand over heavy weapons but not personal weapons. To whom? Still open. Ramallah wants the weapons handed to it, but the United States won't accept that. Who will receive the heavy weapons will be the "international stabilization force," but that awaits the Security Council.

In contrast to Egypt, whose position regarding a model city in Rafah is questionable, for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, the response will be positive, but on condition that Israel withdraws from any territory into which Arab entities enter, and certainly international forces. Saudi Arabia has a demand to remove Smotrich and Ben-Gvir from the government, and it can be assumed that in the upcoming conversation between Trump and bin Salman, he will try to dissuade him from this demand, since he needs specifically Bibi to lead these moves, because his damage in the opposition would be heavier, and because he—Trump—is taking matters into his own hands and won't allow the grandmizers to spoil the next stages. There's concern that bin Salman won't accept this, and Saudi Arabia's position remains in question.

Meanwhile, the situation is shaping up with Israel on one side of Gaza, Hamas and Turkey on the other. Israel has an opportunity in the interim period to establish facts on the ground in the area under its control, such as initiating a port in Rafah. Israel? Sorry—this needs to be proposed to the real landlord: Trump and Blair.