It remains unclear whether the Abu Shabab clan can truly take control of Gaza, possibly with assistance from other clans. This seems highly unlikely, but for now, the very reliance on this clan endangers the hostages—perhaps not intentionally, but as an inevitable consequence of this policy.

Why? Because the entire logic of the clan policy is to replace Hamas. If you want to replace Hamas, there's no point in involving them in negotiations to end the war, since negotiating with Hamas about ending the war leaves Hamas as the authority in Gaza. Will this happen? Won't it happen? Meanwhile, attempts are being made to find hostages through IDF operations without Hamas involvement, resulting in the discovery of bodies. While it's important to bring our hostages back to grieving families, this approach endangers the living hostages—both by leaving them to deteriorate in tunnels and because approaching IDF forces put their lives at risk. I suggest taking seriously Matan Tzangauker's warning that IDF forces approaching his captivity endangered his life.

Complications with Egypt

There are additional problems with the clan policy that could unnecessarily complicate Israel's affairs, primarily the escalation of tensions with Egypt.

It has emerged that Israel did not act alone regarding the clans, but in cooperation with Palestinian Authority security forces from Ramallah. There's nothing wrong with this—on the contrary, Israel-PA security coordination is an important security asset. However, in this specific case, this security cooperation in the Rafah area, near the Egyptian border, undermines Egypt's policy of establishing an agreed-upon expert committee that would manage Gaza the day after, with the blessing of both Ramallah and Hamas. Ramallah's participation in the Israeli project is designed to exclude Hamas from the day-after scenario, bringing the PA alone instead.

No one in the Arab world trusts the PA to manage Gaza. After the Prime Minister's slogans of "no Hamas and no Abbas"—will Abbas still receive the keys to Gaza? This seems hard to believe, and not just because of opposition within the government to such an astounding scenario.

Arab Involvement and American Withdrawal

Reports have emerged from Jerusalem that another Arab state is partnering in training the Abu Shabab clan, with hints pointing toward the UAE. This seems like spin in the style of Feldstein and Orich. I don't see such an Arab state on the near or distant horizon, and the spin is designed to show that it's not just Israel alone with the Palestinian Authority, but that there's an Arab framework—which doesn't exist.

The importance of inventing an Arab factor stems from American withdrawal from the equation, leaving Israel alone with the PA—meaning: after we left Gaza, the occupation returns, because even with the PA, until there are permanent agreements with it, Israel remains an occupying power under the Oslo Accords.

Qatar's Hidden Role

But perhaps there is an Arab power that is at least a covert partner to part of the "assistance"—Qatar.

Why Qatar? Because the clan initiative ensures that the Rafah crossing remains closed, and as long as the Rafah crossing is closed, Qatar is the only Arab power in Gaza, projecting its influence through Kerem Shalom, with the UAE as minimal partners to avoid leaving Qatar alone.

So not only do Israel and Abu Mazen undermine the Egyptian plan for the day after, but they also perpetuate the closure of the Rafah crossing to allow Qatar to establish itself.

I don't believe there's a connection between Qatar and the Abu Shabab clan, but rather that Qatar anticipates the entire initiative will collapse, and then Qatar will bring its Hamas people to manage Gaza.

It should be noted that Hamas leadership in Gaza, which Israel is eliminating one by one—and rightly so—serves Qatar's interests, since the seniority of Hamas's internal leadership in Gaza over the external leadership sitting in Qatar largely blocked Qatar's Hamas leadership from positions of influence.

This again goes against the interests of Egypt and the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, which are waiting for a strategic role in Gaza the day after, which Israel with the PA and Qatar are currently blocking.

The Daesh Connection

Avigdor Lieberman proved that the Abu Shabab clan was part of the ISIS apparatus in the Rafah area and Sinai. The question Israel asks: How does this align with the claim that the PA is involved in establishing this militia?

Well, in Gaza's unique reality, you can be both Fatah and Al-Qaeda, and everything is fine.

For example, Gaza's Doghmush clan was both part of Fatah's preventive security and part of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and also leaders of the notorious Al-Mujahidoun militia of the Sharia clan, the murderers of the Bibas family, who were eliminated in recent days, started in Fatah's Al-Aqsa Brigades.

In general, the Rafah area was crawling with Al-Qaeda operatives, and Hamas invested great effort to uproot Al-Qaeda from this area, including destroying their mosque in Rafah with all its worshippers and leaders.

Fatah connected with them to create a front against Hamas. Is Israel heading in the same direction?

The Bottom Line

But first and foremost—all these questionable moves endanger the lives of our hostages. That's the main point.