Israel's particular interest in developments in Syrian Kurdistan stems from a tangible danger that the terrorist organization ISIS could be resurrected to full strength, this time directed against Israel and Jordan. ISIS's intention is to seize control of Kurdish prisons holding 11,000 members of the organization, thereby reconstituting it. Several hundred ISIS detainees have already been released and have disappeared into Syria. According to Kurdish sources, the number of released prisoners amounts to several thousand.

To understand what is happening today, one must revisit reports from a month ago about a shootout inside Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa's palace, between his men and ISIS members who came to see him for talks whose nature was not clarified. Simultaneously, there were other reports of an assassination attempt against him while traveling in his vehicle near the palace, though what actually happened remains unclear. In any case, al-Sharaa has virtually disappeared—he appears only in fleeting photo opportunities, including a brief visit to Saudi Arabia. These days, when meetings are reported between him and Syrian Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi, he is not seen.

In any event, relations between al-Sharaa and ISIS have been strained for many years, as al-Sharaa refused ISIS's demand to become an organization with an international terror orientation, and refused to turn Syria into a new Afghanistan. His Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which reorganized in Idlib under Turkish patronage, was a Muslim Brotherhood organization, not ISIS. ISIS also accused al-Sharaa of passing intelligence to the United States, thereby enabling the elimination of several of its senior leaders.

Therefore, it is clear that a meeting between its leaders and al-Sharaa was bound to be fraught from the outset, raising the question: why did they meet now? The answer we are seeing before our eyes in Kurdistan—ISIS demanded the return to areas that were the heart of its caliphate in ISIS's glory days: the capital Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Al-Sharaa, who wants the restoration of Syrian sovereignty, not ISIS's return, refused. The fact that things are happening anyway suggests he has capitulated—under Turkish and American pressure.

Regarding Turkey, matters are clear. It views the Kurds as a threat and covets the oil wells under their control. It has long been planning the invasion. Regarding the United States, matters are less comprehensible. Their relationship with the Kurds was a stabilizing anchor for Syria, yet they changed their minds due to the special relationship between Trump and Erdogan. The Special Envoy for Syria and Lebanon, Tom Barrack, said strange things inconsistent with reality: he claimed that since the ISIS threat in Syria has disappeared, there is no longer justification for the Kurds' separate existence outside the Syrian framework. This is odd, because ISIS is actually strengthening in Syria, and its entire interest in Kurdistan is to remove the most effective force fighting it.

Turkey has armed the new Syrian army as if it were a real army, but it is still a militia among the array of militias that still dot Syria's landscape, and Turkey supports its own militias, primarily Turkmen militias that participated in the attack on the Kurds.

One of the Kurds' major problems is their lack of internal unity. The leading force is the SDF—the Arabic acronym for Syrian Democratic Forces. Democratic in this context is formerly Soviet—that is, communist, even Marxist. This is a major problem for the Kurds, who are primarily traditional and religious, not Marxist. The Marxist character of the SDF is a red flag for ISIS and Julani, and therefore continued warfare between them can be expected, even after the SDF relinquishes the Islamic caliphate territories they captured in the war against ISIS and defends the Kurds within their own territory.

During Assad's rule, the Kurds were loyal to the central government in Damascus, and during the great uprising, the Kurds did not participate in the Muslim Brotherhood's fighting against the regime, thereby helping Assad concentrate forces against the Muslim Brotherhood. Only when the ISIS threat grew did they respond to the United States' request and became the boots on the ground that defeated ISIS in face-to-face combat. Therefore, how great was their disappointment with Tom Barrack's announcement that they had fulfilled their role and were no longer needed, in the spirit of: the Kurd has done his part, the Kurd can go.

A remnant from Assad's days still exists in Syria, in a force controlled from Mount Qandil in Iraq, which is pro-Iranian under the leadership of Jamil Bayik. The remnants of Iranian orientation among the Kurds could also be an engine of continued warfare, but essentially, the leadership of the SDF is Kurdish in the full sense of the word. They reject all temptations to be part of Syria and integrate into the Syrian army, and notably, they have recently been speaking openly about contact with Israel.

In truth, even during the war against Assad, the Kurds sought contact with Israel, but Israel found no interest in developments in northern Syria. Now the situation has changed. Although al-Sharaa's relationship with the United States ostensibly guarantees Israel's interests, it absolutely does not.

It is unclear whether al-Sharaa actually controls Syria, and it is unclear who will control the caliphate territories to be captured from the Kurds. ISIS wants to return, and all indications are that this will happen. Thousands of released prisoners will constitute the new ISIS army, this time under Turkish and Qatari control.

During the war against Assad, ISIS refused to enter into confrontation with Israel. Now that Assad has been removed, the target is Israel and Jordan. ISIS announced this openly, and the Jordanian army participated with the Americans in eliminating ISIS cells that emerged on the Jordanian border.

So those troubled by Turkey and Qatar in Gaza should be no less troubled by ISIS's resurrection in Syria. he Kurds are calling on Israel for help. In the past, Israel did not respond. Perhaps now the time has come