Translated from Israel Time

The Venezuelan crisis is primarily a matter for the Americas, but it also carries implications for the Middle East that directly affect Israel—both opportunities and risks.
To begin with, Venezuela has long been an integral part of Iran’s global alliance network and served as the deep rear of Qassem Soleimani’s “ring of fire” designed to encircle Israel: Hezbollah, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and Hamas.

Venezuela was also a key link in the drug‑trafficking route used by Hezbollah and the Assad family. Anyone seeking an illustration of the nexus between politics and drug cartels can watch the series Queen of the South. Although it focuses on Mexico, it mirrors the Venezuelan model, where senior politicians and military officers head major cartels. The series also demonstrates how these cartels threaten the United States through deep infiltration—paralleled in Venezuela by the penetration of Iranian and Hezbollah operatives.

From Israel’s perspective, another dimension is Venezuela’s support for BDS and for Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al‑Maliki’s efforts to isolate Israel and bring its case before international tribunals in The Hague.

Former President Hugo Chávez even placed his personal aircraft at al‑Maliki’s disposal to rally additional South American states to the Palestinian cause—thereby expanding Iran’s influence across the continent.

Al‑Maliki, formerly a representative of the Popular Front within the Palestinian Authority, served as a conduit through which Venezuela supported left‑wing organizations driving the BDS movement, such as the Democratic Front and various NGOs in Ramallah.

A shift in Venezuela’s orientation toward Iran, Hezbollah, and the radical Palestinian left could therefore be a strategic boon for Israel.

Such a trend—combined with upheavals inside Iran—weakens Hezbollah’s bargaining power vis‑à‑vis the Lebanese government. Alongside Israeli pressure to resume the conflict, this could produce positive surprises.


A cautionary note: threats must be credible precisely, so they do not need to be carried out. It is not in Israel’s interest to become entangled in another war in Lebanon.

Domestic political considerations, however, may undermine careful tactical management and drag Israel into an unnecessary conflict that destabilizes Lebanon’s delicate internal balance and weakens the central government rather than strengthening it.

In a less direct connection to developments in the Americas, we can observe Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, internal dynamics in Syria, and the unexpected rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The blow dealt to Iran—beginning with the Israeli Air Force’s success and the establishment of an “Airforce Arc” where the Shiite Crescent once stood—triggered shifts in Yemen. With the Houthis’ rule appearing to near its end, the question of who will replace them has sparked a dispute, escalating into armed clashes between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Riyadh backs the ousted Yemeni government, while Abu Dhabi supports a rival faction to ousted government. Saudi Arabia views this as a challenge to its leadership not only in the Arabian Peninsula but across the Arab world.

When Saudi Arabia asked the UAE to assist in the war against the Houthis, it did not anticipate that this would lead to an independent Emirati policy in the Red Sea—an area Riyadh considers its own strategic domain.

This ties into Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. The UAE did not join the all‑Arab condemnation of Israel’s move, effectively placing it on Israel’s side, while Saudi Arabia took the opposite position. Riyadh sees the quiet Israel‑UAE partnership in the Horn of Africa as a challenge to its leadership in the Red Sea and, by extension, the Arab world. All of this was set in motion by the blow delivered to Iran and may accelerate further due to developments in Venezuela that weaken Iran even more.

If we frame the Saudi‑Emirati dispute ideologically, Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve the territorial integrity of Arab states and avoid destabilizing them. This explains why Riyadh did not join the UAE’s intervention in Libya’s civil war and why it insists on maintaining the territorial unity of the Palestinian Authority.

This brings us to Syria. Reports have emerged of an assassination attempt on President Ahmad al‑Shar’a—denied, but unconvincingly. Syrian television aired brief, distant footage of him, yet he has not delivered a public address to demonstrate that he is fully in control.

Two versions circulate: one claims his convoy hit an explosive device en route to the palace; the other—far more consequential—suggests he was wounded in a shootout inside the palace itself. According to this account, during a meeting with former ISIS associates intended to calm tensions between the Syrian army and a renewed wave of ISIS attacks, the encounter spiralled into an exchange of fire between hosts and guests.

My analysis: it is unclear how ISIS operatives could have obtained weapons inside the palace unless elements within al‑Shar’a’s inner circle were complicit, and the entire meeting was a staged assassination attempt disguised as reconciliation talks.

This incident has implications for a central question in the Middle East: whether to support the fragmentation of regional states or preserve their territorial unity. The reemergence of ISIS revives this debate.

The Kurds were the most effective force against ISIS. Fighting ISIS requires Kurdish cooperation—but the Kurds also symbolize Syria’s fragmentation and stand as an obstacle to its reunification. Was al‑Shar’a’s outreach to ISIS intended to eliminate Kurdish autonomy? Since we do not know what truly happened in the palace—or which version is accurate—we can only pose questions, not answers.

This question also affects Israel‑Syria discussions over the so‑called “security arrangement.” A deep divide separates al‑Shar’a and Israel regarding Syria’s future. Israel seeks to retain the Golan Heights, the Mount Hermon summit, and support for the Druze. Al‑Shar’a demands Syria’s territorial unity—meaning Israeli withdrawal from Hermon and eventually the entire Golan. Regarding the Druze, Damascus insists it alone is responsible for their security. Israel faces a dilemma: President Trump wants the agreement as part of his global peace achievements. Netanyahu must choose—align with Trump or with Israel’s long‑term interests.

And of course, Turkey. Ankara seeks to remove Kurdish and Druze obstacles in its drive toward al‑Aqsa and Jordan.

In the coming election year—unfavorable as it may be—Israel is unlikely to make decisions free of personal and political considerations. The question is whether time is on our side.