Translated from Israel Time

One of the surprising developments from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump was the focus on developments in the West Bank. Trump reportedly demanded that Netanyahu halt hilltop youth violence and provide economic assistance to the Palestinian Authority—meaning: restore the funds that Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has withheld. In other words: halt Smotrich's "decisive plan."

This demand was preceded by an American request to allow Abu Mazen's deputy, Hussein al-Sheikh, to enter Jerusalem. That is: we face pressure not only in the West Bank, but in Jerusalem as well.

What does this mean? Saudi Arabia is at the door. These positions should be attributed to Trump's meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman about a month ago. Trump wants to bring Saudi Arabia into the regional processes he's leading, and the Saudis have two interlinked conditions: meaningful progress toward a Palestinian state, and the removal of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Smotrich from the government. Riyadh is unwilling to draw closer to Israel under its current government.

From Netanyahu's responses, one can understand that he folded—not only in the West Bank and Jerusalem, but in Gaza as well. From Trump's assertive statements, contrasted with Netanyahu's pale stance before him, one can already understand that Turkey will enter Gaza, and the Rafah crossing will open in both directions. In other words: Smotrich will be forced to abandon not only his decisive plan in the West Bank, but also the renewal of Gaza settlements.

This means fulfilling Saudi Arabia's demand will come as an internal Israeli process, not as compliance with an external demand.

Netanyahu's comprehensive capitulation to Trump stems from his being the weakest prime minister vis-à-vis American presidents ever. In truth, the Mar-a-Lago meeting wasn't even an official meeting. There was no White House statement about it, and Trump himself said Netanyahu invited himself, and he agreed. Trump wanted to hold a trilateral meeting at the White House with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi after Israel—again under Trump's pressure—approved the gas agreement with Egypt. But el-Sisi didn't want to see Bibi.

Netanyahu also folded on Hamas disarmament. They agreed on a two-month extension, but the announcement on launching the next phase will come in two weeks, including a peace council headed by Trump, with participation from the Palestinian experts committee.

If Hamas doesn't disarm, the IDF won't disarm them. The IDF's role is finished. Trump spoke of an international force—meaning: Turkey.

And in general, when discussing Hamas's weapons, we're no longer talking about missiles threatening Israel but personal weapons. This is no longer about threats to Israeli cities, but terrorism in the Gaza envelope. This too is a problem requiring attention, but not on the scale we've grown accustomed to in recent years.

This brings us to the elections taking shape over Hamas leadership, with two names mentioned—Khaled Mashal and Khalil al-Hayya.

Before entering this matter, it should be emphasized that regardless of any elections, past or present, the real leader of Hamas is Khaled Mashal, because he is closest to the ear of Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and serves as his man for Muslim Brotherhood subversion in the Arab world.

Khaled Mashal was among those who established, together with Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—today President Ahmed al-Sharaa—al-Nusra, which later came under Turkish patronage in Idlib, and the rest is known.

Khalil al-Hayya became known for his contacts with the United States, but all of Hamas's leadership in Gaza has been eliminated, so if the elections reflect the true balance of power, Mashal will be elected—that's my bet. But if there's a desire to help Gaza recover, they'll choose al-Hayya. In any case, Mashal is the de facto leader.

The need to choose an official Hamas leader now stems from the need to reach an agreement with Hamas on weapons collection, and to make it easier for Turkey to do this, ostensibly.

Will Saudi Arabia be satisfied with this? It's unclear. Saudi Arabia demands that Hamas disarm and abandon the "muqawama" (resistance) ideology. Qatar and Turkey oppose this. They want to preserve the muqawama, even if only symbolically. Unfortunately, Israel, instead of standing with Saudi Arabia in this internal Arab dispute—is siding with Qatar.

There's a sense that when Trump put a question mark over the visit itself, there were frantic contacts between Netanyahu's office and Trump's people about a deal between the two that wouldn't embarrass Netanyahu.

It's important for Trump that specifically Netanyahu lead his plans in Israel, because the anemic opposition won't be able to withstand the poison machine if Netanyahu is on the outside and they're leading the government.

So the deal was that Trump would strengthen Netanyahu's position on Iran, without real commitment. Netanyahu wanted the Iran issue to push aside the Gaza issue, but Trump said things supporting Netanyahu's position on Iran—but not at Gaza's expense. Gaza comes first.

But beyond that, Netanyahu received Trump's support in his election campaign, with Independence Day played out to be Netanyahu's pardon day without remorse or shame. That's the patent behind awarding Trump the Israel Prize.

In Conclusion

After Netanyahu gave Trump everything he asked for regarding Gaza and the West Bank, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich will struggle to continue with him. Since Bibi will do everything to avoid holding elections in September, close to the anniversary of the envelope massacre, and he has Trump in May with Herzog's "pardon"—that's when he'll direct early elections.