English Translation from Israel Time

Ahead of Benjamin Netanyahu's meeting with President Trump on Monday, it's worth noting that all the proposals on the table for ending the war share one common element: removing Qatar from the equation. Therefore, it can be assessed that Qatar will pose difficulties.
Trump's Leading Initiative
The leading plan is President Trump's, which calls for appointing Tony Blair as a sort of high commissioner for Gaza who would be responsible for reconstruction efforts. He would derive his authority from the Palestinian Authority, which could enter Gaza after an unspecified period (one version suggests after five years) once it completes substantial reforms and Hamas surrenders its weapons—though it's unclear to whom: to an authority that doesn't yet exist, or to an international force.
Those who worked on this plan include Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and Tony Blair himself, and it can be assumed that Netanyahu has already accepted it. His confidant, Ron Dermer, participated in formulating the framework, and Blair is very close to him.
A preliminary sign was the appointment of a coordinator of government activities in the territories from outside the IDF—Yoram Levy, who will receive the rank of major general, presumably to be closer to the economic aspects of Gaza's reconstruction.
Alternative Initiatives
Alongside this Trump-led plan, the second initiative comes from Saudi Arabia and France, which prioritizes recognition of a Palestinian state before moves in Gaza. In my opinion, Saudi Arabia is participating with France superficially, perhaps as pressure on Trump, but is actually on the side of Trump's plan. Evidence of this was Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's absence from New York, leaving French president, Macron, alone, just as he was absent from the heads of state speeches at the Doha conference after the IDF attack.
Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen announced his support for Trump and Saudi Arabia, thereby linking himself to Trump's initiative in connection with Saudi Arabia. From Abu Mazen's perspective: Qatar and Hamas are out of the picture.
Egypt's Diminishing Role
With the emergence of these plans, the old Egyptian plan is fading, after no one addressed her proposal, which left Hamas in the picture—even with its weapons—while Egypt would take charge of Gaza's reconstruction with the help of an expert committee acceptable to Ramallah and Hamas. Abu Mazen immediately rejected the Egyptian initiative and refused any role for Hamas, neither symbolic nor substantive. Nothing.
The Egyptian initiative also received a cold shoulder from all relevant parties because Egypt refused to join the demand that Hamas disarm. Another reason: President Trump gave President Sisi the cold shoulder after Sisi refused to come to the White House, against the backdrop of Trump's "Riviera plan."
Egypt also understood that if it's decided to disarm Hamas, this task would fall to her—a role she doesn't want. But when she saw that plans were developing that left her in the shadows, she asked Saudi Arabia to mediate between her and Trump, and the reconciliation succeeded. The sign was Sisi's blessing of Trump's initiative. Later, an Egyptian statement appeared saying it would agree to send an army to Gaza but only if defined as an international force under a Security Council resolution, not as an Egyptian force.
International Aid and Immediate Implementation
An important part of Trump's proposal is returning aid to Gaza through international institutions—namely, the UN. In the Al-Arish area, 200 UNRWA trucks are waiting to transfer to Gaza through the Rafah crossing "immediately," as Arab media reported on Trump's plan—through the Rafah crossing that will reopen.
Summary of War-Ending Initiatives
Trump's Initiative: The leading initiative prioritizes Gaza's reconstruction under Tony Blair, without a path to a Palestinian state, but with Ramallah's blessing.
Saudi-French Initiative: Prioritizes recognition of a Palestinian state, demands Hamas disarm but without surrender.
Egyptian Initiative: Establishing an expert committee with Hamas and Ramallah's agreement, without demanding Hamas disarm.
Abu Mazen's Position: He is the sole sovereign in Gaza, without Hamas at all.
What we saw in UN corridors was Egypt and Saudi Arabia's rapprochement with Trump's initiative. The expressions were Sisi's letter of support to Trump and bin Salman's absence from standing alongside French President Macron.
Future Implications
If, as expected, Trump's initiative leads the end of the Gaza war, Saudi Arabia will leave France and join the United States, potentially opening horizons for normalization with Israel. There will be that "something tangible" for a Palestinian state, creating conditions for another Saudi demand—removing Ben Gvir and Smotrich from the government.
This is exactly Netanyahu's big test in meeting with Trump. There's already an old promise to Trump to proceed with the deal during Knesset recess when the coalition partners cannot topple him. But the collision's intensity is so strong that government dissolution moves will seem immediate right after the recess ends.
Domestic Political Challenges
Why? Because the "governability" government decided on punitive measures against the Palestinians—and Jordan—over the wave of recognition of a Palestinian state, including annexation steps.
The Yesha Council has painful memories of the previous "governability initiative"—annexing the Jordan Valley to Israel during Trump's first term. Netanyahu cultivated this hope in them, and when it no longer suited him, it evaporated—as if it never was.
Can Smotrich and Ben Gvir absorb this repeated failure? Once, perhaps—but twice? Netanyahu systematically deceives them. What will they tell their constituents?
In his strange UN speech, Netanyahu didn't mention that Judea and Samaria are our forefathers' homeland—a bad sign for what's coming—but also didn't go along with Trump's initiative for a quick end to the war, demanding Hamas's "defeat."
So if on Monday Netanyahu announces adoption of Trump's plan, he will clash with Ben Gvir and Smotrich. It can be assumed that Netanyahu will actually use this threat to his government in his favor.
As mentioned, Qatar also has a problem with all these initiatives. Will Netanyahu and Qatar cooperate in thwarting them?
