The Huwara fire started the road to recognition of a Palestinian state

Hebrew Translation – Israel Time

The catalytic event that led to Europe's massive recognition of a Palestinian state can be traced to the

burning of the village of Huwara by hilltop youth, February, 2023, which served as a burning beacon to the world about the need to intervene in the Palestinian problem, when the IDF, the official sovereign, failed in its mission to protect the Palestinians—and was itself attacked by the hilltop youth

Subsequently, that same Huwara drew IDF forces away from defending Gaza Envelop to secure the provocative sukkah of those same hilltop youth and other scattered outposts in the West Bank, which drained IDF forces to protect them—but that's another story.

For our purposes, until the Huwara burning, the International Criminal Court in The Hague delayed its decision on Palestinian complaints with sham rulings, without any real decision. But immediately, while the flames of Huwara were still burning on television screens worldwide, the Palestinian Authority's Foreign Minister, Riyad al-Malki, rushed to lawyers’ convention in Switzerland, met with the new tribunal president, Karim Khan, and in that corridor meeting, the Criminal Court shifted to actual activity against Israel. When Karim Khan came to investigate Hamas crimes in the October 7 massacre, he decided to balance Hamas crimes with the actions of hilltop youth, and the rest is known, linking the solution to the Gaza problem with recognition of a Palestinian state.

This outcome is "Jewish handiwork,” For many years, the West Bank enjoyed quiet, and Palestinians had no motivation or ability to renew intifadas or terrorism. Even before the catalytic event of Huwara, hilltop youth actively worked to stir up the Palestinian problem by attacking Arab villages, and the Kahanist branch in Jerusalem made sure to raise the question of Israel's status on the Temple Mount, with flag marches chanting "burn down your village" in the alleys of the Old City. In fact, the hooliganism of hilltop youth continues to this day, increasing international motivation to intervene.

From Sinwar’s documents , it emerges that the need to defend Al-Aqsa served as the primary motivation in all rounds of confrontation with Israel, led by the infamous Al-Aqsa Flood.

Now we have reached recognition of a Palestinian state and UN discussions, which requires us to have a different kind of discussion. As far as one can follow the UN discussions and behind-the-scenes international moves, things are not as they appear.

The hysteria in Israel over the wave of Palestinian state recognition—that soon a "terror state in the heart of the land" will arise—is far from materializing. The problem isn't that a Palestinian state will arise, but that this recognition will be the international lever for sanctions against Israel and declaring it the South Africa of the new era. Hence, the activity Israel should pursue is not against Europe—that would only worsen the situation—but against hilltop youth, but this isn't possible since they now control the Defense Ministry.

The bottom line is that European recognition of a Palestinian state is conditional. Europe demands that the Palestinian Authority undergo deep reform that would actually turn it into a state: changing the curriculum that doesn't recognize Israel, stopping funding for terrorists' families, and above all—renewing legitimacy through elections.

The demand for elections is what frightens Ramallah most. In a conversation with a source close to Abu Mazen, I heard a surprising position that Abu Mazen himself is not enthusiastic about the developments, especially the demand for elections, and that he links it to Syrian-Israeli reconciliation contacts, to bring Hamas to power in the West Bank after the Muslim Brothers in Syria make peace with Israel. This isn't my opinion, but the spirit in the Muqata'a corridors, and according to this, one should examine Abu Mazen's moves.

Indeed, Abu Mazen's recorded speech at the UN was rhetorical honey to European ears, so as not to put obstacles in the wheels of Palestinian state recognition, but the details of his positions were most disturbing.

First, he completely omitted the Oslo Accords—he effectively cancelled them before Smotrich did. The source of authority for a Palestinian state is the international legitimacy of UN decisions, which are the 1947 partition decisions and the right of return for refugees.

When discussing a Palestinian state, Abu Mazen was obligated to outline its borders, but he refrained from doing so. The international ear is accustomed to hearing the traditional Palestinian formula: a Palestinian state within 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital, but when we expected to hear this now, with the momentum of Palestinian state recognition—we didn't hear it. The reason is that for two years now he's been talking about the 1947 partition borders. He mentioned the 1947 borders in his UN General Assembly speech already in 2022.

Generally, it's hard to find enthusiasm in Palestinian Authority territories about the state announcement. In conversations with ordinary Palestinians, they don't believe it will happen, and the Palestinian Authority has no desire to organize the celebration shows it did in the past.

Basing the Palestinian state on UN decisions clashes head-on with President Trump's conceptions, as expressed in his UN speech. He is really, really, really against the UN and unwilling to accept its authority in anything and even wove hints of sanctions against the UN if it advances Palestinian state recognition moves.

This aligns with his disagreements with Europe over globalization, and in the argument with Europe over the Middle East, one can say that while President Trump sees the root of the problem in Hamas, Europe sees it in Israel. So I support Trump, but Israel must take into account that a Democratic administration in the White House could shift the balance against us again—see: Obama.

Here we reach clarification of Saudi Arabia's real position. Apparently, Saudi Arabia together with France leads the Palestinian state recognition move, yet Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman didn't bother to come to the UN Assembly alongside his partner, President Macron.

In our view, Saudi Arabia's entire move toward Palestinian state recognition is consciousness-based, not political. Tactical, not strategic. Saudi Arabia must protect itself from Al Jazeera's poison, as the Gaza war is a source of excellent incitement material for destabilizing the Arab world.

Saudi policy in Lebanon illustrates its conceptions regarding Gaza—dismantling armed militias throughout the Middle East. This is the current move in Lebanon. Hezbollah remains, but without weapons, as a political party. Applied to Gaza—Hamas remains, but without weapons, and this is surprisingly the Muqata'a's fear of the reform required of them—giving an opportunity for political, unarmed Hamas to legitimately join the Palestinian political system in the state era.

This also stands at the root of the Saudi-Qatari dispute: Saudi Arabia wants disarmament, while Qatar clings to the principle of muqawama (resistance).

Since Abu Mazen didn't convince in his speech that this is his line, and the position he presented was that Hamas would hand over its weapons to the Palestinian Authority, without saying unequivocally that he opposes muqawama, from Saudi Arabia's perspective, there's no transition from tactics to strategy.

But the distancing from Israel will continue since continuing the Gaza war serves Al Jazeera, and from Saudi Arabia's perspective, that's what matters most.