
In yesterday's barrage of fake spins and propaganda during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's two press conferences—one for foreign media and one for Israeli press—one slide stood out above all others: Israel's principles for ending the war, which largely align with Saudi Arabia's positions.
These principles include: dismantling Hamas's weapons, returning all hostages and bodies, demilitarizing the Strip, Israeli security control over Gaza, and alternative civilian governance that is neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority.
The problem is that after Netanyahu presented the slide about dismantling Hamas's weapons, he spoke in terms of eliminating Hamas entirely—and this has been the sticking point between Saudi Arabia and Israel until now.
Saudi Arabia agreed to Hamas's presence, but without weapons, while Israel demanded Hamas's complete exile from the Strip. The slide suggests Bibi has accepted Saudi Arabia's position, but his words indicate he still hasn't. So now, who knows what's truth and what's spin? Let's hope the slide represents the truth, and the rhetoric is just spin.
The Lebanon Model
Bibi mentioned the emerging solution in Lebanon, and this is the model Saudi Arabia proposes for Gaza—just as Hezbollah is being dismantled of its weapons without dismantling the organization itself, so too in Gaza: keeping Hamas but as a political party, not as a military militia.
It's also worth noting that the era of the "American company" has ended. Bibi openly admitted its failure, and the "humanitarian city" was also essentially non-existent. Indeed, our entire existential anchor in Rafah has disappeared entirely—neither mentioned in his words nor shown in his slides. In other words: prepare for the resumption of the Rafah crossing. If Saudi Arabia enters—it will only be through Rafah, not through Kerem Shalom.
Along with Rafah, all the corridors disappeared—Netzarim and Morag—and what remains is the envelope along the Strip's borders. Let's hope the envelope doesn't follow the corridors' path.
The Contradiction in Netanyahu's Presentation
The most difficult contradiction in Netanyahu's words was in the slide showing how the IDF controls most of the Strip with only two enclaves remaining in Gaza and the central camps, as if eliminating them too was no big deal and would "not only not extend the war, but actually shorten it."
Well, if the "American company" failed because Hamas looted the aid, Hamas controls even the places Bibi presented as if the IDF controls them.
Another puzzling point—if this is an "American company," how is it that Israel is stopping its operations?
The Netanyahu-Chief of Staff Conflict
This is the crux of the confrontation between Netanyahu and Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir. Zamir made four statements that anchor his approach:
- Not to endanger the hostages
- He will not allow commanders to give orders under a "black flag" flying above them
- He will not lead the IDF into Hamas traps
- He wants to see a government decision that sets clear objectives for the IDF
In other words, Chief of Staff Zamir knows that all of Bibi's maps are incorrect, and if he decides not to comply with government decisions, the law will be on his side. Let's hope we don't reach that point.
Education and Regional Players
It's also worth noting Netanyahu's words about the importance of changing Gaza's curriculum. Exactly right. Changing the curriculum from a jihad-oriented education to one of moderate Islam open to Christianity and Judaism is key to Gaza's future, and the West Bank's too. This is Indonesia's curriculum, which has been seeking to enter Gaza from day one—and being rejected. The Gulf's curriculum could also work, and they too are waiting at the door—and being rejected.
Everything Netanyahu talked about yesterday was already achievable from the war's beginning. Bibi closed Rafah and removed everyone.
The Saudi Demand
There's a central issue Saudi Arabia demands: the removal of Ben Gvir and Smotrich from the government. As long as they're there—Saudi Arabia won't take any step with Israel. In the Hebrew press conference, Bibi made every effort to convince them to stay, but this could also be reverse psychology—if they leave on their own, he at least tried everything to make them stay. Supposedly.
The Palestinian Authority Question
There's another statement worth noting—neither Hamas nor the PA. Regarding Hamas, we've already discussed the contradiction between the slide and oral statements, but regarding Abu Mazen, the proximity between Israel's positions and Saudi Arabia's positions is surprisingly similar, despite all of Saudi Arabia's demands to advance significantly toward a Palestinian state.
But Saudi Arabia's position involves demanding reforms from Abu Mazen that he cannot and will not make. In all contacts regarding the day after in Gaza, no party takes the Palestinian Authority seriously, and we'll elaborate on this another time.
However, there's another serious landmine that the entire approach with Abu Mazen could explode over. Everyone talks about recognizing a Palestinian state at the UN Assembly in September, but in his UN Assembly speeches, Abu Mazen speaks about 1947 borders—the borders of international legitimacy for solving the Palestine problem—not the 1967 lines, which are the basis for the Oslo Accords. If he speaks about this in the upcoming assembly too—this will be the end of the Palestinian Authority's role in the process, regardless of how many countries recognize it.
