
Below the radar, developments are taking place in Saudi Arabia's leadership whose importance can hardly be overstated. If they succeed, they will bring about a revolution in the Middle East that will complete the revolution wrought by the air force in the former Shia crescent.
Saudi Arabia's activity has two wings: the Lebanese wing and the Gaza wing. What both share is the disarming of militias and their transformation into political parties. This includes the PLO organizations in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
The Lebanese Front
About a week ago, Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen was summoned to Beirut, where he heard from President Joseph Aoun that as part of unifying weapons in the Land of Cedars under government control, the PLO must disarm its organizations. This means the entire era of resistance has ended, and there will no longer be militias in Lebanon.
While weapons held by militias in refugee camps were mainly used for internal conflicts, the visit revealed that in Ahmad Jibril's hideout in Nuwaima near the Syrian border, long-range Hezbollah missiles were hidden.
It's clear to everyone that Abu Mazen is incapable of dealing with the organizations, and certainly not of removing the missiles in Nuwaima. But the talks in Beirut were designed to prepare the ground for the Lebanese army's entry into refugee camps, which means canceling the Cairo Agreement of 1969, in which Lebanon recognized PLO autonomy in refugee camps and the legitimacy of Palestinian weapons as long as they didn't leave the camps.
Just as the PLO didn't honor the agreement, the Lebanese government was careful not to enter the camps, and the state of anarchy that took hold there stems from a situation of lawlessness.
The moment the Lebanese army enters, especially the missile hideouts in Nuwaima , the resistance chapter ends, with implications for justifying Hezbollah's existence.
The Palestinian Question
When the Cairo Agreements chapter ends, the major question of Palestinians' status in Lebanon will arise. The Cairo Agreements may have been good for the PLO but bad for Palestinians because they prevented them from integrating into the Lebanese state.
Abu Mazen avoided visiting the camps because the general sentiment among refugees is "enough of being refugees." Why do Syrian refugees integrate into the state while they remain trapped in camps?
Global public opinion, including in Israel, is unaware that if there is racism and discrimination, it's the racism and discrimination of Lebanese toward Palestinians. They are forbidden from all types of work except menial labor and are prohibited from acquiring education.
The Lebanese share in emigration from Lebanon is very high. Disarming Palestinian organizations and opening Lebanon's job and education markets to Palestinians ends the refugee chapter and naturally eliminates UNRWA.
Saudi Arabia stands behind these developments because it wants to transform Lebanon from a Shia state into a Sunni state.
The Gaza Strategy
These moves are led by Saudi Arabia and France, and against this backdrop, one must understand the moves regarding Gaza. Just as they're ending the resistance chapter in Lebanon, this is also the intention for Gaza.
In New York, representatives of France, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE convened ahead of the Palestinian State conference in Rome in about a month. It's worth noting who didn't participate: Qatar and Egypt—and the Palestinian Authority.
To understand why, one must return to the preparatory meeting in Riyadh about a month and a half ago ahead of announcing Egypt's Gaza rehabilitation plan. Saudi Arabia said it wouldn't invest a penny as long as Hamas keeps its weapons. Qatar objected because "we must preserve the resistance," and Egypt didn't take a position because it understood that once force would be required to disarm Hamas, it would be Egypt itself.
Once Egypt didn't take a position, Saudi Arabia prepared the alternative plan with France, as France is its partner in Lebanon.
Hamas and Negotiations
What about Hamas? Khalil al-Hayya has already agreed to this in talks with Bohler, provided it's a move toward a Palestinian state—exactly Saudi Arabia's position. Therefore, one should assess that behind the scenes there are already contacts between Saudi Arabia and Khalil al-Hayya, who would be "their man" in Gaza.
It's somewhat strange that in a preparatory meeting for discussing a Palestinian state, they didn't invite Palestinian Authority representatives, because Arab states' intention isn't really to establish a Palestinian state but to create a process toward it.
The moment Abu Mazen's people are invited, they'll come with their maximalist demands and derail the move. Therefore, they weren't invited to the preparatory talks in Riyadh either.
Israel's Position
What about Israel? One could say that once the Israeli delegation left Doha, an obstacle was removed from direct talks between the United States and Hamas. Indeed, there are already reports of another partial agreement that will involve a ceasefire that will be leveraged for talks on ending the war and resolving the hostage affair.
Who needs Israel if it can't be included as a partner?
