Reports of renewed nuclear talks between the United States and Iran, now under President Trump's administration, and a new hostage deal are interconnected. What links them is Trump's upcoming trip to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states – the American president is opening the Saudi chapter of his presidency.

Saudi Arabia was behind the nuclear talks in Oman, as their diplomatic efforts are currently focused on reconciliation with the Shiite power, that has already ked to a joint defense alliance for the Arab/Persian Gulf. The reason: Saudi Arabia knows that if Iran is attacked by Israel, the Iranian response will target them, causing massive destruction and triggering a global energy crisis.

In recent years, Israel could have created the Middle East Alliance that Biden had pushed for, deploying its sophisticated defense systems in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Instead, Israel chose different paths, and now we've reached a moment of truth where the military option isn't practical – despite the Air Force having dominated the former Shiite arc and possessing the military capability to destroy Iran's nuclear program.

For Saudi Arabia, as an Islamic and Arab power, progress with Israel cannot continue while the war in Gaza persists and the "hilltop youth" escalation continues in the West Bank – certainly not with Ben Gvir's provocations on the Temple Mount. During Ben Gvir's absence from the Ministry of National Security, we enjoyed some quiet on the Temple Mount, which unfortunately ended with his return during Eid al-Fitr.

Saudi Arabia also demands "tangible progress" toward a Palestinian state. The Saudi Foreign Minister has warned against plans to allow Ben Gvir to establish a synagogue on the Temple Mount.

In other words: progress between Saudi Arabia and the United States potentially creates a new coalition crisis in Israel. One can only hope that Netanyahu won't promise to "compensate" Ben Gvir for restraining his Temple Mount activities by creating tensions with Bedouins in the Negev.

Tensions with Smotrich may arise around the " something tangible " that will at minimum require stopping the hilltop youth's rampages, not to mention the revival of Trump's "deal" from his previous term, which created a crisis between the Yesha Council and Netanyahu but enabled the Abraham Accords.

Due to Saudi Arabia's leadership position in the Arab Gulf, it cannot join a political initiative started by others – meaning it cannot be part of the Abraham Accords and must initiate something new. It's likely they will initiate the Red Sea Alliance to protect shipping routes from the Houthis – an alliance that would include Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, all of whom have been affected by the closure of Bab al-Mandab. This is a vital interest for Egypt due to the severe impact on the Suez Canal.

Qatar is aligned with the Houthis, and Turkey's opposition must also be considered, as they have their own aspirations in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

This brings us to the increasing chances of a new hostage deal. Note that recently, there's been talk only of the "Egyptian proposal" rather than the "mediators" (Egypt and Qatar). Egypt's influence is rising at Qatar's expense. Is this in preparation for the establishment of a "Red Sea Alliance" and Qatar's disconnection from Gaza?

Steve Witkoff, who is connecting threads between the hostage deal and the nuclear talks, stated that Qatar should join the Abraham Accords – meaning its role belongs in the Gulf, not in the Red Sea and Gaza. Qatar is important to the United States not only for hosting the large American base in Al Udeid but also as a liaison to radical Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood.

During preparatory talks in Riyadh for the Cairo conference on Gaza's future, fundamental disagreements emerged between Saudi Arabia and Qatar regarding Gaza. While Saudi Arabia demanded Hamas disarm, Qatar insisted on preserving the "muqawama" (resistance) and leaving weapons in Hamas's hands. Consequently, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was absent from the Cairo conference, and Saudi Arabia remains out of the picture regarding Gaza's future. The only military force capable of taking action is Egypt, but they are unwilling, and as long as this remains the case, Gaza's post-war scenario is stalled.

Regarding the muqawama, it's worth noting the understandings between Khalil Hayya and Bohler. Hayya agreed, as part of a comprehensive agreement, that an Arab/international military force could enter Gaza to collect Hamas's weapons. This is still aspirational, but in terms of the fundamental dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar over the muqawama, what Hayya essentially agreed to leans toward the Saudi position of abandoning the resistance principle, transforming Hamas from a fighting jihad organization into a political party; this is also the general direction for Lebanon.

The difference between Lebanon and Gaza is that Lebanon has a government and political system – there is an address. Gaza has a vacuum, and currently, Khalil Hayya represents Gaza, his life spared by being in Lebanon when the Gaza war broke out. Not only did he survive, but he's the only one who can somehow speak for Gaza, and Hamas's decision to have him address Palestinians during Eid al-Fitr symbolizes his position as Gaza's point of contact.

The understandings between Bohler and Hayya upset Ramallah and created problems for Abbas. According to sources in Ramallah, Abbas was criticized for his unwillingness to cooperate with Egypt, which created an opportunity for Hamas to establish a connection with the United States.

Indeed, at the core of the Egyptian proposal is a committee of experts agreed upon by both the PLO and Hamas to manage post-war Gaza. Abbas insists that only the Palestinian Authority should govern Gaza without Hamas's participation. He worries not only about the principle that the PA, which considers itself a state, is the sole legitimate authority in Gaza (with Hamas being a rebel force), but he also understands what Egypt has in mind – they're looking toward the West Bank as well, and the Fatah-Hamas model could expand northward, allowing "political Hamas" to infiltrate the West Bank.

So, the situation is "complex," but at least we may soon see the release of our hostages. For now – that's the main thing.