Ahead of the return of abductees today – lessons from the previous round

While three hostages have safely returned home and hopes remain high for the deal's completion, several concerning signals have emerged, particularly from the Israeli side.

Hamas has successfully projected an image of victory, with its Nukhba (elite) forces protecting the released hostages in Gaza City's Saraya complex, the symbol of Gaza governance. The question remains whether Hamas is positioning itself for the next round of conflict or marking its territory vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority and Arab states as the sole address for Gaza's future reconstruction.

The reconstruction path remains uncertain: will Qatar lead the effort, or will it flow through Egypt's planned donors' conference in Cairo, involving Saudi Arabia and Gulf states as part of the broader Israel-Saudi peace process and Abraham Accords expansion?

Yesterday's events suggest Israel is maintaining its alliance with Qatar, potentially at the expense of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Abraham Accords partners.

This became evident when the Rafah crossing remained closed, with an aid convoy stranded in Sinai, while Kerem Shalom opened for limited water and fuel supplies, falling short of the agreed massive humanitarian aid package.

Several factors contributed to this situation. First, Egypt failed to form a joint team acceptable to both Hamas and Ramallah, largely due to Abu Mazen's firm rejection of any post-war partnership with Hamas.

Per the agreement, the IDF would thin its forces near the crossing after preparing it for reopening, potentially creating an impression of Egypt accepting continued IDF presence near the crossing.

Another likely factor was UNRWA's large convoy waiting at the border. For Netanyahu, both the Nukhba forces' visibility in central Gaza and UNRWA aid convoys may have been too much to accept.

While his spokespersons suggest Egypt is blocking aid due to opposition to UNRWA, this is clearly spin. Egypt has no quarrel with UNRWA, a UN organization not subject to Knesset legislation.

As long as Egypt remains blocked at Rafah, Qatar emerges as the designated power broker for the day after. This was evident in the delayed information about the hostages' identities. Their presence in Saraya makes the communication difficulties explanation somewhat dubious. Was this a maneuver to demonstrate Qatar's exclusive connection to Gaza, contrasting with Egypt's limited access? All related updates came through Qatar.

Israel's continued special relationship with Qatar contradicts regional developments, particularly in Lebanon and Syria. Broadly speaking, Saudi Arabia is reasserting itself in Lebanon while Qatar strengthens its position in Abu Mohammed al-Jolani's Syria. Saudi Arabia backs the election of President Joseph Aoun, Lebanon's former army chief, who will oversee southern Lebanon's reintegration in a way that ensures Israeli border communities' security. He has pledged to allow weapons only in state hands, effectively committing to disarm Hezbollah throughout Lebanon, not just south of the Litani.

Moreover, the agreement with Israel already establishes de facto IDF-Lebanese Army cooperation. When Israel identifies armed activity, it notifies the Lebanese Army, and only upon Lebanon's admission of inability to handle the situation is the IDF authorized to act, with Lebanese consent.

Interestingly, in recent developments, Hezbollah and Amal, initially hesitant about Joseph Aoun and the Western-backed Prime Minister-designate Nawaf Salam, have announced their support for the new government formation – the first to be free from Syria's heavy shadow and Hezbollah's internal pressure.

In Syria, Saudi Arabia is working to counter Qatari and Turkish influence by attempting to draw Jolani toward the Saudi-led Arab League, against Turkish-Qatari pressure to remain in their orbit.

Currently, he aligns with Turkey and Qatar. It's worth noting that Khaled Mashal, before the major anti-Assad uprising, established with Jolani the initial cells that would become Nusra Front and later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

So, at this moment, as Saudi Arabia positions itself against Qatar regionally, Israel aligns with Qatar. Looking toward Syria, Turkey stands behind Qatar. Is Israel really aiming to bring Turkey into Gaza?

Inconceivable! Or perhaps yes.