We were happy to hear this morning about progress in talks regarding a hostage deal, and we hope these aren't merely "tactical" reports aimed at pressuring one side or another to be more flexible, but rather represent genuine progress. We'll keep our fingers crossed.

Without knowing what's really happening in the depths of the negotiations, we can outline who are the factors pushing for a deal and what are the obstacles standing in the way.

What gives cause for optimism is Trump's entry into the White House and the complete coordination between him and outgoing President Biden on this matter. In other words: The U.S. Presidents consider releasing "our hostages," as Netanyahu oratorically put it, more important than the Netanyahu-Ben Gvir-Smotrich triangle, and if there's a real catalyst for a deal, it's the timing of the presidential transition in the White House.

Another factor that might help facilitate a deal is Netanyahu's trial. He must prove that testifying in court doesn't interfere with his functioning as Prime Minister. Since he has run out of wars, and an attack on Iran is not feasible at this time (which we'll discuss separately), the deal remains his only opportunity for a major event proving he can manage crucial matters even during trial days.

That's on the pro side. On the con side, there are other weighty issues. Again regarding Netanyahu – the question is whether he truly wants a deal, or just wants to prove to Trump that he did everything, but "Hamas is to blame."

What's stopping him from completing the deal? The promises he likely made to Ben Gvir and Smotrich – to Ben Gvir a synagogue on the Temple Mount, and to Smotrich the "decisive plan" – meaning: transfer. Now, the practical matter of establishing settlements in northern Gaza has also emerged, and Netanyahu must maneuver between a deal that maintains the coalition with apparent promises to his partners, and a formula for implementing a reasonable deal.

The full spectrum ranges between a complete deal ending the war and releasing all hostages, to a partial staged deal allowing partial releases with fixed ceasefire periods. A complete deal conflicts with the promises to Ben Gvir and Smotrich, while partial stages allow maintaining the coalition framework, as the option of settlements in the northern Gaza remains on the table.

The big question is about the Rafah crossing. Returning control of the crossing to Egypt conflicts with the notion of total victory and war's end, as it opens a path for Hamas and Qatar to bring in forces that will replace them over time. Fundamentally, Netanyahu closed the crossing to prevent an alternative to Hamas – and to Qatar, whose influence on Gaza comes from Tel Aviv, not from Egypt.

The crossing issue is connected to Egypt's vision for the day after. Egypt seeks to establish an administrative body, not necessarily comprised of distinct Hamas and Fatah members, but acceptable and agreed upon by both movements, which would begin managing the crossing from Gaza's side, and later develop into a body managing the Strip after the IDF's withdrawal and war's end.

Egypt's problem is that it repeatedly falls for formulas involving Palestinians, and the Palestinians are incapable. Palestinian Authority officials came to Cairo and refused to include Hamas in any formula. According to Palestinian sources, Abbas's people told Egypt that Hamas is responsible for the great disaster and should not be given any foothold in managing the day after, which should instead be handed over to the PLO-Ramallah exclusively.

The matter of PLO-Ramallah's return to Gaza has been on the international diplomacy table since day one of the Gaza war. Western powers viewed this positively but demanded deep reform from the Authority, which Abbas rejected. He told U.S. Secretary of State Blinken that reforms are a sovereign matter of the Authority, not subject to external involvement. Western nations forced Abbas to establish a government under businessman Mohammad Mustafa, who also manages the Authority's economic company – PIF (Palestinian Investment Fund), but the Prime Minister, who is attentive to donor nations' demands, again raised the need for reforms, this time from within the Authority, not as external pressure. However, Abbas feared that if Mohammad Mustafa led the reforms, he would be marked as heir, endangering Abbas and prematurely opening a succession war.

So now the Gaza committee has been thwarted, Authority reforms have stalled, and Egypt and Western powers are stuck. The reason Egypt is now going along with Netanyahu on a staged arrangement is that it wants more time to form the joint Fatah-Hamas body, which won't be established, and this is the major concern for completing the deal after the first stage.

Opposite Egypt's position is Qatar's stance, which aligns with Hamas's position of ending the fighting with a comprehensive deal, but Qatar's position is tactical-political, not strategic. It doesn't want to give Egypt the leadership in Gaza, and against Egypt's ideas, it raises its own proposals. However, after Qatar's impressive achievements in Syria, it would be generous to give Egypt the small deal, as a gesture to Trump.

As mentioned, this analysis is based on the parties' positions, not on information about what was actually said behind closed doors, and we hope to be proven wrong, and warrant seeing all our hostages return home soon.