Mapping the Iran–U.S. Mediation Tracks and the Saudi Countermove

To understand where the war is heading, we must first identify who is mediating between Iran and the United States — and whom those mediators represent. The principal mediator is Pakistan. Why Pakistan? For several reasons: every Arab state is a party to the conflict and therefore cannot serve as a neutral broker. But beyond that, Pakistan is bound to China — and the power standing behind this mediation track is China. In other words, Pakistan is mediating between the United States and China, with China expected to deliver Iran's agreement and thereby bring the war to an end.

Whatever the eventual arrangement, if China is the party that brokers it, Beijing will emerge with enhanced standing in the Gulf. If this is achieved in partnership with Pakistan, it will strengthen the China–Pakistan axis and, in turn, deepen Pakistan's ties with Iran. This is something Saudi Arabia cannot accept — and it is the backdrop to the direct talks that recently opened between Iran and Oman. The meeting held at the beginning of this week in Mascat was not designed to produce an agreement; it was designed to establish a competing axis to Pakistan's. In the end, Iran came to Mascat to propose dividing the transit revenues through the Strait of Hormuz — an offer Oman could not accept, and was never intended to.

So where does Saudi Arabia fit in this equation? Riyadh is not speaking publicly, but behind the scenes it is assembling a new regional architecture — one designed not merely to confront Iran, but to block China. Last week, President Trump was expected to deliver statements in which he would fulfil his promise to end the war, declaring that the Strait of Hormuz is "not our problem." He pulled back. Reports have circulated that Saudi Arabia persuaded him not to withdraw from the arena, not to cede a foothold in the Gulf to China — and, by extension, not to allow the Pakistani mediation track to succeed.

For Trump to listen, Saudi Arabia need only refresh a set of longstanding unfulfilled pledges: investing one trillion dollars in the American economy, assisting with oil prices, advancing normalization with Israel, and participating actively in military operations against Iran.

If the China–Pakistan track is unacceptable to Saudi Arabia, what track could it support? In all likelihood, an axis running through India, the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, and Israel — precisely because that framework incorporates normalization with Israel.

Why not the track Turkey is pressing for — rerouting the energy corridor through Ankara, positioning Turkey as Europe's energy terminal?

For both practical and historical reasons. Beginning with the practical: Europe is not prepared to trade one dependency for another. It has barely extricated itself from Putin. But history matters here too, because it bears directly on the power structure within the Peninsula — and particularly on the long-running, visceral rivalry between the House of Saud and Qatar's Tamim tribe.

Tamim bin Hamad is not merely the Emir of Qatar; he harbors ambitions to lead and speak for the Tamim tribal tribes — a grouping that includes many princes of the House of Saud, though they are barred from succession, which is reserved exclusively for the Aniza tribe.

During the House of Saud's long campaign to consolidate control over the Peninsula, the Ottoman Empire backed the Tamim — and since nothing is more current than history, a revived Turkey–Qatar alignment at so sensitive a moment poses a genuine strategic threat to Riyadh.

One of the fundamental questions still to be resolved is whether the water separating the Arabian Peninsula from Iran should be called the Arabian Gulf or the Persian Gulf. Accepting Iran's conditions regarding the Strait of Hormuz would be tantamount to the world endorsing the Persian designation. This would carry far-reaching future implications for Iranian territorial and political claims vis-à-vis the Peninsula states — and that alone is sufficient motivation for Saudi Arabia to block the Pakistani mediation track.

The Arabian Gulf designation also carries implications for Saudi engagement with Ahwaz. The coastline opposite the Arabian Peninsula is Arab-populated territory under Persian rule. Saudi Arabia has, until now, refrained from intervening in Ahwaz. That restraint may no longer be sustainable. Military involvement is not the expectation — but support for the Arab underground seeking liberation is.

In truth, the Arab underground in Ahwaz has already approached Israel for assistance — and Israel showed no interest. It is somewhat puzzling that Israel went to war to bring about regime change in Iran while ignoring various opposition movements that sought its support and received none.

On normalization: Saudi Arabia is demanding that Israel demonstrate progress on the Palestinian issue. The current Israeli government, however, is using the Palestinian question as a tool for generating tension, while Riyadh is demanding de-escalation.

There are signs that Washington has accepted Saudi Arabia's conditions. Reports indicate that the United States is now pressing Israel to halt the hill-top terror in the West Bank — including unusually direct statements from Ambassador Michael Huckabee, as pro-Israel a figure as one could conceive. And even as all eyes remain fixed on Iran, talks with Hamas over the post-war governance of Gaza continue.

Saudi Arabia will join the India–Israel axis not only to block the Pakistan–China–Iran alignment — but for that to happen, the United States must first clear another strait: the chokehold of Ben Gvir and Smotrich.