
Lebanon, Iran, and the United States — What Is Really Cooking Behind the Scenes
Could the escalation on the Iran and Lebanon fronts be concealing a surprise — a ceasefire agreement and the opening of peace talks between Lebanon and Israel?
Too good to be true, and in the near term there is no reason to expect good news on the prospects of war's end.
There is a distinction between the war against Iran and the war in Lebanon, yet the common thread linking them is that the decision rests with President Trump — and he will determine when both fronts quiet down.
Lebanon: The Dermer Signal
Perhaps we should begin by explaining what is happening in Lebanon. In this regard, attention must be paid to remarks made in the United States by Ron Dermer, a close confidant of the Prime Minister. Dermer stated that the negotiations with Lebanon could be concluded without great difficulty, since the points of contention over border demarcation are relatively straightforward. In other words: the man charged with managing the Lebanon negotiations is speaking about delineating the international border — not the inflammatory coalition rhetoric about turning the Litani River into a new boundary.
The question is how much backing Netanyahu is giving his envoy to advance the Lebanon track along the lines Dermer outlined in Washington. My inclination is that Dermer returned under American pressure, and that his moves are being coordinated with Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff.
Can Netanyahu move now toward talks with Lebanon grounded in a peace agreement contingent on Israeli withdrawal to the old border? He cannot — and Dermer, in his remarks, set the record straight when he spoke of the need for a broad-based government, including for the purposes of a Lebanon agreement. He said patience is essential, and that no shortcuts should be expected.
Is there any realistic prospect, given Lebanon's internal balance of power, for these things to materialize? Not at present — but in principle, the chances today are better than before as a future option.
Hezbollah's Isolation
At present, Hezbollah — which is waging war against Israel on Iran's behalf — finds itself isolated not only within Lebanon but across the Arab world.
Lebanon's most prominent Shiite leader, Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament, opposes the war Hezbollah launched and demands that the terrorist organization disarm. Yet when it comes to talks with Israel, he is unwilling to include representatives of his own faction in the Lebanese negotiating delegation for as long as Israeli forces remain on Lebanese soil. The test will come when Lebanon assembles its negotiating team: will he actively oppose the move, or remain neutral and await the outcome of the talks?
France, which was among the mediators of the process, has stated that Lebanon cannot negotiate under fire. The question then arises: are we headed for a ceasefire once negotiations open — likely in Cyprus — with Israel retaining its positions in southern Lebanon pending an agreement, while Hezbollah stores its weapons?
It should be noted that Israel's military pressure in Lebanon is directed at the Shia community, which bears the full burden of the war. They are fleeing northward, only to find that other Lebanese are not welcoming them — and are blaming them for the catastrophe that has befallen the country.
Israel's destruction of bridges over the Litani River is a signal that the displaced may not be able to return — unless Hezbollah halts its fire and enters a track of negotiations toward disarmament. That disarmament remains the key to any settlement in Lebanon.
Iran: Back-Channel Diplomacy
As for Iran, there too back-channel contacts are underway that may produce surprises. Saudi Arabia has stepped in to broker a formula over the Strait of Hormuz, and diplomatic activity is intensifying — including from the Egyptian foreign minister. This does not mean an agreement is in the offing, but Egypt senses that something is afoot and wants to be part of the solution, if only for appearances.
Saudi Arabia convened consultations in Riyadh among Arab and Muslim states — and strangely, it remains unclear who participated. The question is whether Saudi Arabia also invited Egypt to the talks, or not.
The question does not arise in a vacuum. A crisis erupted between Egypt and the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia after they accused Cairo of failing to back them when Iran attacked them. Hints were published that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia might withdraw their investments from Egypt — whereupon Egypt immediately issued statements declaring its support for its "Arab sisters." But is that too little, too late?
Why would Egypt take such a step — withholding support from its "Arab sisters" at their hour of trial? The answer may lie in Cairo's fear that ultimately, instead of energy transit through the Strait of Hormuz, oil-producing states will prefer routing their shipments through Red Sea ports to Eilat, and from there to Europe. That would mean the Suez Canal losing its strategic importance.
Egypt can be reassured on one count: the current Israeli government will fumble this opportunity — just as Dermer expressed similar concern about the Lebanon settlement.
The Endgame: Trump's Victory, Not Netanyahu's
Broadly speaking, Israel has in effect concluded the war insofar as missiles and nuclear capability are concerned. On the nuclear front, it is already known that the enriched material is buried deep beneath the rubble of the Isfahan facility. As for the missiles — painful and tragic as the casualties they inflict on Israel are — they are, thankfully, far from constituting a strategic threat.
Israel continues fighting because standing alongside the United States at this critical moment — before the Hormuz confrontation reaches its decisive point — is the right thing to do.
The war will end with either an agreement or a decisive outcome over the Strait of Hormuz, and ultimately the terms will be settled between Washington and Beijing. Netanyahu's problem is that this will be Trump's victory portrait — not his.
It should be noted that Netanyahu is intensifying his appeals to the Iranian people to take to the streets. That would be his victory portrait — but in large measure it runs counter to American objectives. If Washington wants an agreement, it wants the regime, in one form or another, to remain. It needs an address for the deal.
In sum: Netanyahu wants the ayatollahs toppled now — for electoral reasons. Trump wants that perhaps later, maybe never — because right now he needs an address to resolve the Hormuz crisis, and to end the war.
