The difference between a war against Iran and a world war lies in China's entry into the conflict — and, to a lesser extent, a Kurdish invasion of Iran. Do the latest developments signal that the war with Iran may end before it escalates into a full-scale global conflict?

Since last weekend, China has been showing signs of unease. The oil fields of Ahwaz, in southern Iran, are vital to the Chinese economy, and the reason they have been spared from attack is precisely to keep Beijing out of the war. Voices in Israel — such as that of opposition leader Yair Lapid — calling for a swift end to the war by striking Iran's strategic assets fail to account for China's interests. Israel and the United States, by contrast, have every reason to tread carefully around Chinese sensitivities.

Perhaps the time has come to assure China that even under a post-ayatollah regime, its interests in continued Iranian oil supplies will be safeguarded — possibly under new terms following the end of Persian occupation of the Arabs in Ahwaz. But the overriding interest of keeping China out of the war demands that its concerns about the future be addressed.

This brings us to the war's principal objective: the overthrow of the ayatollah regime. Last week, there was talk of a Kurdish invasion of Iran aimed at bringing the war to a decisive conclusion.

It will not happen. First, the Kurds do not want the role, and second, they are not capable of it. Why don't they want it? Their trust in the United States — and in Israel — is close to zero. The Americans betrayed them twice. The first time was when the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq declared independence, only to discover, to their shock, American advisors embedded within the Shiite militias dispatched to crush their sovereignty. They lost precious territory to the central government in Baghdad in what they perceived as an American betrayal.

The second experience is more recent — the American betrayal of Syria's Kurds, who were the very force that enabled the United States to defeat ISIS, and who held ISIS prisoners to prevent the group's revival. And yet, once again, the United States is backing Syria's president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, against them — allowing him to slaughter them and to release the ISIS detainees in their custody. So why would the Kurds now serve any American purpose?

Here we touch upon Israel's great strategic failure: its inability to leverage the bloody war in Syria to cultivate allies — the Kurds and the Syrian National Army — who actively sought ties with Israel, only to be met with indifference.

Had Israel built alliances with the Kurds and secular Sunnis back then, it could have blocked Turkey's takeover of Syria and would today have a solid foundation for involvement in Iran at this critical juncture. Instead, Israel unwittingly handed the keys to Turkey.

And here we arrive at Turkey's red line. From Erdogan's perspective, any role for the Kurds in a war against Iran is simply inconceivable. Just as Ahwaz's oil is China's red line, an active Kurdish role in the war against Iran is Erdogan's — and would compel him to intervene militarily, once again raising the specter of the conflict expanding to global proportions. The question is whether the war's approach toward the threshold of global involvement might actually hasten its conclusion.

There are signs that it might. Note the surprising announcement by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that Iran would cease its attacks on Gulf states — he even apologized for past strikes. The result? Immediately after the announcement, attacks on Gulf states resumed.

How to explain this? Yet another case of "Iranian treachery"? The Arab press points to a deep internal rift within Iran, with hardline ayatollahs attacking the president's remarks and declaring that the United States should apologize to Iran — not the other way around.

To understand the root of this internal dispute, one must consider Iran's lessons from its great war against Iraq, in which all Arab states except Syria united against it. In the subsequent American-led war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, even Syria joined the U.S.-led coalition. The convergence of all Arab states against a non-Israeli enemy — whether against Iran or Iraq — was regarded in Tehran as a strategic threat of the highest order.

The ayatollahs' lesson was to leverage the threat from Israel and the cause of liberating Jerusalem to prevent the Arab world from uniting against Iran, redirecting its energy from the Sunni-Shiite struggle toward the conflict with Israel.

It follows that the Abraham Accords and the push toward Saudi-Israeli normalization awakened Iran's demons from the war against Iraq. Tehran responded along two parallel tracks: the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, and a charm offensive toward Saudi Arabia — facilitated, naturally, by vigorous Chinese mediation — aiming to torpedo normalization through the Gaza war on one hand, and reconciliation with Riyadh on the other.

All of this collapsed with Iran's attacks on the Gulf, reviving the very scenario Tehran feared most — a Gulf-Israeli alignment against Iran. The Iranian president's charm offensive was meant to restore the old playbook. Too late?

Much depends on what happens inside Iran itself. Reports from within the country suggest that the Revolutionary Guards want to cut short the internal power struggle by swiftly appointing Khamenei Junior, wresting control from the interim triumvirate led by Pezeshkian, which also includes a representative of the Supreme Court and a representative of the religious authority. In other words: the Iranian state versus the Revolutionary Guards, who represent Khomeinist ideology rather than the interests of the state.

As best one can assess the nature of the current war in Iran, it appears focused on eliminating the Revolutionary Guards' assets. The question is whether the intent is to bolster the triumvirate so it can prevail over the Guards and end the war. This parallels the question of war aims in Lebanon: Is Israel fighting Hezbollah in order to give the advantage to the government that represents the state over the "revolution"? Has Israel even defined such an objective, or — as in Gaza — is it avoiding a decision in order to keep the illusion of settlements in southern Lebanon alive for Smotrich and his allies?

If Trump decides to end the war in Iran through a deal with the triumvirate, Israel would perceive it as a defeat — not because it would actually be one, but because, as in Iran and Lebanon, there is no full alignment between the state and its government. For Netanyahu, the war's objectives do not fully overlap with the state's interests; he wants an outcome that fits his campaign slogans of "total victory" and similar rhetoric.

Netanyahu senses the war may end on terms that don't match his slogans, and he is intensifying his appeals in Farsi to the Iranian people to take to the streets. But they are not coming out.

Why? First, Iranians have self-respect. They will not take orders from a foreign leader. Second, Iranians have fled Tehran because of the war. The regime controls the streets.

The irony is that Iranians will return to the streets only after the war ends — and only if Netanyahu stops trying to lead the protests. A revival of the protest movement is certain. Iranians are fed up with the regime. But instead of slogans, the project of toppling the regime must be taken seriously, starting now — helping Iranians organize the overthrow and lay the foundations for a successor government.

And here we must return to the Kurdish question. The Kurds of Iraq and Syria will not enlist in this mission. But the Kurds of Iran itself deserve consideration. They have not yet been betrayed, and they can be organized alongside other minorities. Not talk — action.

What could have been done during the war in Syria, and was not, must be done now — not as campaign slogans, but as genuine statecraft.