A war between the United States and Iran now appears almost inevitable. There are no direct negotiations between the parties; what is actually taking place is mediation by Turkey and Gulf states aimed at preventing a confrontation — so far without success.

It was reported yesterday that another meeting between the parties is scheduled for Thursday in Geneva. The outcome remains uncertain, but at this stage the talks are not about reaching an agreement — they concern only the formulation of an agenda for future discussions.

Why? Because there is not even agreement on what to discuss. Iran is willing to talk only about the nuclear issue within the parameters of the agreement reached under former U.S. President Barack Obama and in accordance with its rights under the NPT. The United States rejects this framework, since its starting point is that Iran sought a nuclear weapon — and having abrogated the Obama deal, President Donald Trump cannot return to it.

The mediating parties attempted to "narrow the war zones" — to reach an understanding that would prevent large-scale confrontation by pre-agreeing on a limited clash. This approach succeeded during the Twelve-Day War, but there is no sign it is working this time. Meanwhile, even buying time to delay the outbreak of hostilities is considered an achievement by the mediators, who fear they themselves will be caught in the crossfire.

Saudi Arabia, which has previously suffered attacks from Iran and the Houthis, is doing everything in its power to prevent the war — including sharpening its rhetorical tone toward Israel.

Under Israeli pressure, the issue of missiles was added to the agenda alongside the nuclear question — though this remains meaningless as long as no formal agenda exists. Once one is established, the chances of the missile file being included are slim: many countries possess missiles, and missiles alone do not constitute a casus belli, whereas a nuclear program does.

The central strategic question confronting American war planners is: what is the objective? What is the war for? Is the goal regime change, or the permanent elimination of Iran's nuclear program?

Eliminating the program does not necessarily require toppling the regime — the regime could remain in place and perhaps collapse on its own later. But if the goal is regime change, then removing the government would, by definition, also eliminate the nuclear threat.

It is worth recalling that this entire sequence of events began with a mass uprising by the Iranian people, who took to the streets after Trump encouraged them by declaring that "help is on the way." If the United States has deployed such an enormous military force, its real objective is most likely regime change. Yet it remains unclear who would replace the current government, and whether any alternative governing nucleus exists that could serve even as a transitional administration.

In recent weeks, the profile of Reza Pahlavi, son of the deposed Shah, has risen — but it is far from certain that an alternative government is operational and ready to assume power.

And what of Israel? There is a genuine conflict of interests between the government and the state. Israel as a state is strongly interested in staying out of the war. If Trump has taken command — let him lead, and it is better that we do not enter the line of fire.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's solo dash to Trump was almost certainly intended to persuade the president not to strike. His coordination with Qatar likely played a role as well. But Netanyahu's problem is his own rhetoric; his campaign slogans about "lion-hearted heroes" and the electoral platform he built on "the resurgence" stand in complete contradiction to discreet appeals for restraint.

Yet because the danger of war exceeds the prospects of preventing it, Netanyahu cannot afford to remain on the sidelines. How would it look if "the statesman of global stature" were kept out of the spotlight? Once again, campaign slogans are driving policy. It is reasonable to expect that Netanyahu will ask Trump to leave the strike on Iran's missiles to Israel — so he can later claim that he and Trump together prosecuted the war.

Israel does possess exceptional covert operational capabilities inside Iran. But such operations lack public visibility, and their value for the campaign is limited. Netanyahu has already discovered that the major achievements of the Air Force and the Mossad inside Iran yielded no political dividends in the polls. From his perspective, a war right now would be a wasted war.

So will Israel participate? Everything depends on whether the United States wants it to. The strategic dilemma is clear: if America is capable of winning wars on its own — what added value does Israel offer? During the Gulf War, the United States barred Israel from participating in order to preserve the broad Arab coalition supporting the operation. This time, Arab states are on the other side of the fence, and Washington's original intention to forge a grand alliance between Israel and the moderate Arab states was thwarted by Israel itself.

In his Knesset address, Netanyahu dropped the missile issue from the agenda — apparently recognizing that it has no realistic prospect of being implemented. He warned that Israel will respond forcefully to any attack against it, and this warning deserves to be heard. One can only hope that the proportions of such a response will reflect the calculus of statecraft — not of an election campaign.