The most significant surprise regarding the day after in Gaza is the emergence of the United Arab Emirates as a central player, already present and operating in the Rafah area within the yellow zone under Israeli control.

There were already preliminary signs of this development when UAE flags appeared on aid convoys arriving in Rafah, distributed by Abu Shabab's militia operating in coordination with Israel. The UAE had already established connections with municipalities in the southern Gaza Strip, becoming—alongside Qatar—the only actors to establish contact through the Kerem Shalom crossing. Qatar maintained ties with Hamas, while the UAE connected with municipalities in southern Gaza.

As fighting intensified, the UAE's contact with the collapsing municipalities ceased, but has now been renewed through Abu Shabab's militia.

What happened? To understand this, one must grasp what concerns the UAE: Turkey. Everyone is talking about Turkey deploying troops to Gaza, but that's not the real danger. The real threat is that Turkey will bring in aid organizations, and since it won't want contact through Israel, it will demand a port in Gaza to establish a maritime connection. The concern is that Israel will agree, claiming it successfully prevented Turkish military entry into Gaza and that opening a Turkish port is a "reasonable price" for this "major achievement."

But this is a nightmare scenario for the UAE, Greece, Cyprus, and effectively Egypt as well. To explain this requires viewing the broader picture of the Eastern Mediterranean basin. In Libya, the UAE supports the Benghazi regime under Khalifa Haftar's rule, opposing the Tripoli government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and backed by Turkey.

In his vision of reviving the Ottoman Caliphate, Erdogan devotes special effort to the Mediterranean, particularly since the Eastern basin contains natural gas treasures that Turkey, through no fault of its own, hasn't benefited from. What remains for it is to seize control of others' gas resources, with a focus on Cyprus's gas reserves, which Erdogan eyes covetously under the pretext that he has rights to them because they also belong to Northern Cyprus, which Turkey occupied.

One cannot understand his Marmara flotilla to Gaza without understanding his ambitions to control the Eastern Mediterranean, especially since there are gas treasures off Gaza's coast. After Turkey plants its flag in Gaza and begins building a port, it could claim production rights—not so much to drill for gas, but to insert itself into the gas alliance of Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt. It's worth noting that the UAE has a direct interest here, as it is invested in Israel's gas deposits.

We see that Egypt is an integral part of the Eastern Mediterranean basin alliance—opposing the Turkey-Tripoli alliance in the central Mediterranean. This raises the question: Why doesn't Egypt align with the Israel-UAE-Greece-Cyprus axis? Because it has a more pressing interest: preventing the flood of refugees from Gaza, which is Israel's policy. Only after the Rafah crossing issue is settled in a way that alleviates Egypt's concerns will it be possible to consolidate the anti-Turkish axis. Meanwhile, we've seen Egypt block a support convoy to Gaza departing from Tripoli, and it can be estimated that it will not permit Turkish passage to Gaza. For now, it should be noted that Turkish influence enters Gaza through Israel.

While Turkey halts its rapprochement with Israel, despite the opening of the Rafah crossing, because Israel still adheres to its policy of Gazan emigration to or through Egypt, we see a policy of smiles toward Turkey. But this shouldn't deceive us—if Egypt could straighten things out with Israel, it would prefer that, because in Libya, for example, it is in proxy confrontation with Turkey, and it doesn't want to see a Turkish port in Gaza.

The same applies to Saudi Arabia. It would prefer relations with Israel, because the energy connection between Qatar and Turkey, which already toppled Assad, also threatens Saudi Arabia. Especially given the longstanding discussion of establishing a corridor between India, the UAE, and Israel that would connect India to the Mediterranean and Europe through Israel, rather than through Turkey. The reason Saudi Arabia isn't doing this is similar to Egypt's reason—the Israeli government led by Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. Once this government is replaced, Saudi Arabia and Egypt will join.

But since this doesn't appear on the horizon, Israel must understand that a Turkish army in Gaza isn't the danger—this is unlikely to happen. Rather, the threat is a maritime connection between Turkey's aid infrastructure and Turkey itself.

So since a Turkish port is the problem, an Emirati port could be the solution. As long as Israel remains in the yellow zone, there's an opportunity to begin building the foundation for a port in Rafah that would serve as the port, not a Turkish port in Gaza City.

But, of course, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Israel also has a problem with its own government. Smotrich will sabotage this because it would symbolize the end of the settlement dream and suggest there's still a chance for another round in Gaza. This is what Bibi whispers to him—he's known as the liar son of a liar, but Smotrich pretends to believe him.

And anyway, will Qatar allow Bibi to enable the Emiratis to establish a port? This isn't yet on the table, so there's no answer yet. Does anyone even think about this, or are they waiting for Turkey to begin, and then we'll "respond" forcefully…