The visit of U.S. Ambassador Tom Barack to Israel draws attention to yet another issue that will be contentious at the expected meeting between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago in about two weeks – Syria and Lebanon.

Ambassador Bark summed up the essence of the dispute before arriving in Israel, stating that Israel cannot fight everyone all the time. In other words: Barack has set himself the goal of halting Israel's effort to keep all fronts hot, in a way that prevents President Trump from advancing his plans to ease tensions in the Middle East, in his ambitious aspiration to bring peace to our tormented region.

In concrete terms, Trump wants a security agreement between Israel and Syria, because he wants to stabilize Syria as a long-term U.S. asset. He is also pushing for an agreement to stabilize the situation between Israel and Lebanon, which means Israel would restrain its attacks in Lebanon.

The pending matters between Israel and its northern neighbors do not come at the expense of the situation in Gaza, where Trump is determined to reach the third phase of his plan, and to rehabilitate Israeli-Egyptian relations that collapsed because of Qatargate and subsequently due to Israel's stubborn refusal thus far to sign the strategic gas agreement with Egypt.

Israel's Energy Minister, Eli Cohen, did not hide that "there are security and political matters" between Israel and Egypt, meaning: what appeared to be a new edition of Qatargate – accusing Egypt of threats to Israel that never existed and were never created.

The truth must be told, that the agreement indeed gives Israel a lower-than-usual market price for gas, but after Qatargate, and the unceasing influence campaign against Egypt – it appears that the basis of Israel's prolonged refusal to sign the agreement thus far is not the price of gas, but some new version of the Qatargate affair, allegedly.

Perhaps, if Israel had focused on improving the deal's terms instead of its politics, a better agreement could have been achieved, but Bibi doesn't care as much about the economic aspect as the political one.

In Gaza, Trump is determined to reach the third phase of his plan, and to rehabilitate Israeli-Egyptian relations that collapsed because of Qatargate and subsequently due to Israel's stubborn refusal thus far to sign the strategic gas agreement with Egypt

In the end, it appears that President Trump instructed Netanyahu to accept the gas agreement, and again, as with the hostage deals, an American president is forcing him to take steps that are in Israel's interest. Now, one can expect the tripartite summit to take place between Trump, Netanyahu, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and it is to be hoped that such a summit will improve relations between Israel and Egypt after they fell apart.

Regarding the gas deal with Egypt, there is a surprising implication for the situation in Syria as well, and here we enter speculative analysis, but it is appropriate that we bring this hypothesis to readers' attention. Qatar has its own gas plan, and it is very ambitious and dangerous to regional stability – to connect its joint reserves with Iran via a gas pipeline to Turkey. But this pipeline must pass through Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Since Saudi Arabia and Jordan will not agree to this, there is reason to fear that Qatar, whose "subversion is its craft," will act to destabilize the internal stability within them, in order to topple their regimes.

After the failure of the Sunni rebellion against Bashar al-Assad's regime, Qatar shelved this plan, but after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's surprising takeover of Syria, the plan has been revived.

The question of who will supply gas to Europe – Israel or Qatar – underlies the gas competition in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. On one side of the equation stands the alliance of Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and the UAE, and on the other side stands Turkey, which is making a supreme effort to wedge itself between these countries through support for Hamas in Gaza, in order to crumble the alliance between Israel and its partners.

The gas agreement between Israel and Egypt must be a component in the gas alliance between Israel and its Mediterranean friends, while thwarting the agreement, had it succeeded, would have weakened the alliance, ahead of Turkey's entry into Gaza and its takeover of the port, in order to drive a wedge between Israel and its allies in the gas alliance.

So, how does this relate to Syria? The ISIS attack – the assault on American soldiers in the city of Palmyra – was not carried out for gas purposes; ISIS doesn't deal with that. But for understanding the matter, one must return to speculation about the gas competition. One must understand well the forces operating in Syria around Ahmed al-Sharaa (Mohammed al-Jolani). Not all are cut from the same cloth – far from it. The situation more closely resembles the picture of the old civil war, in which various fundamentalist groups were supported by foreign actors, mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for opposing purposes.

Qatar supported ISIS groups aligned with Turkey, also with the aim of toppling Assad's regime to realize the gas pipeline route to Turkey. Saudi Arabia supported groups that opposed Qatar and sought to thwart its plans. Saudi Arabia was never against Assad. On the contrary, it and Egypt sought in various ways to assist him. Those who came out frontally against Assad were Qatar and Turkey.

What became clear to us after the fact is that Jolani, today Ahmed al-Sharaa, was connected to Saudi Arabia. And it is no coincidence that Saudi Arabia specifically recommended to Trump to support him. Why is it doing this? To block Qatar and Turkey. A topsy-turvy world. All along we thought al-Sharaa was Qatar and Turkey's man, but that is not the case. What this means is that Qatar and Turkey will now look for ways to find internal opposition to him in order to pressure him or even topple him.

How is this related to the attack on American soldiers in Palmyra? It resembles the situation during the Syrian civil war, when a war within a war was waged there – the jihadists against Bashar al-Assad and also among themselves, mainly along the Saudi-Qatar fault line. Palmyra is located in southern Syria, close to the border with Jordan. Destabilizing the situation there could advance Qatar's interests in the contexts we discussed regarding stability in Jordan, which is not far from there.

So, how does all this relate to Israel? The U.S. envoy to Syria and Lebanon, Tom Bark, most likely told the Israeli government to restrain its responses, not to stretch the rope too much, and thereby help stabilize the region instead of destabilizing it.

Destabilizing the situation on the Syria-Jordan border could advance Qatar's interest in destabilizing Jordan. How does this relate to Israel? Tom Bark most likely told the Israeli government to restrain its responses, and thereby help stabilize the region instead of destabilizing it

Israel can be understood, as after the trauma of October 7th it will not allow any threatening force to gather on its borders – but that is not the situation on the border with Syria. If Israel shows restraint in its military activity in Syria, it will not put the question of stability in Syria on the international agenda, and this will not require Trump to take a position on the matter. This is most likely what Trump will tell Netanyahu, and let us hope he finds a receptive ear. At least that Netanyahu will "instruct" Defense Minister Israel Katz to stop making bombastic, provocative declarations.