Will Conflicting Interests Between Netanyahu and Trump Lead to an Explosion?

Translation from Israel Time

As the implementation date for Phase 3 of Trump's plan approaches, disagreements between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump are becoming increasingly apparent. The planned week of meetings between them at Trump's Mar-a-Lago residence in Palm Beach is expected to officially launch Phase 3 toward full Israeli cooperation—no gimmicks, no tricks.

What is the root of the problem? Significant differences in the respective expectations of Trump and Netanyahu for the coming year. Netanyahu is entering an election campaign, having chosen as his campaign issue "the pardon that the deep state is blocking, thereby deepening the rift among the people," while Trump wants to dedicate the coming year to establishing the pro-American axis with the Israel-Saudi alliance at its foundation.

The campaign issue Netanyahu has chosen is "the pardon that the deep state is blocking, thereby deepening the rift among the people," while Trump wants to dedicate the coming year to establishing the pro-American axis, with the Israel-Saudi alliance at its foundation.

Trump's preference will not allow Netanyahu to advance the "pardon and deep state" narrative, and the narrative that will replace it is a Palestinian state and the situation in Gaza, which on the one hand will create rifts within his government, and on the other hand will bring the October 7th narrative back into public discourse. And this is a discussion from which Netanyahu is fleeing like the plague, especially in an election year.

Netanyahu entered into building the "pardon and deep state" narrative following his meeting with Trump after the latter returned to the White House. It's not hard to imagine the two of them sharing similar thoughts about how the justice systems "framed them" and the need to dismantle "these corrupt justice systems." Netanyahu returned from these conversations equipped with the recognition that he has an ally in the United States for a shared struggle against the "deep state."

But what Netanyahu didn't take into account is that while Trump's legal cases are behind him and he has already set himself new goals, headlined by a Nobel Peace Prize, Netanyahu's trials are still ahead of him, and above all stands the challenge of canceling his trials.

Following the remarks by Minister Idit Silman, according to which Trump will punish the justice system if it doesn't cancel Netanyahu's trial, it can be assumed that in the strategic meeting at Palm Beach, Netanyahu will propose to Trump not to settle for calling on President Isaac "Bougie" Herzog to grant him a pardon, but to add sanctions against the system. One can only hope we are wrong, and greatly so, but Silman's remarks must raise red flags on this issue.

Netanyahu returned from Trump with the feeling that he has an ally for a shared struggle against the "deep state." But he didn't take into account that while Trump's trials are behind him—Netanyahu's trials are still ahead of him, foremost among them the challenge of canceling his trials.

Now, regarding Phase 3. What is at stake is Hamas being disarmed and Israel withdrawing to new lines. An Israeli withdrawal without Hamas being disarmed is a position that Israel cannot accept. Such a move is fatal to the narrative Netanyahu is building for election day, not to mention the upheaval in his government, and there is a convergence of state and government interests here.

Government spokespeople speak with great pathos against Turkey's entry into Gaza and its return to Jerusalem. The question is—how did Turkey enter Gaza? After all, Egypt doesn't allow it, it didn't arrive by sea, and not through the tunnels either. Could it be that Israel turned a blind eye to Turkey's entry into Gaza through the land crossings? Unthinkable! The same with Jerusalem. After Israel expelled Turkey, suddenly it's back! How can this be?

Turkey's involvement in the international force will undoubtedly be discussed between Trump and Netanyahu. Netanyahu in an election year, regardless of what's happening on the ground, is committed to a public position against Turkish soldiers who would come in the wake of the NGOs already establishing a foothold on the ground.

The problem is that as long as Hamas remains and Israel holds half of Gaza's territory, no country is willing to come—except Turkey, which will enter the Hamas side of the new line to be drawn between it and Israel. From Israel's perspective, this is a completely untenable situation that even Netanyahu won't be able to get through in Israel. But this, it is feared, is what Trump will put before Netanyahu at their meeting at his luxurious residence.

Government spokespeople speak with pathos against Turkey's entry into Gaza and Jerusalem. So how did Turkey enter Gaza? After all, Egypt doesn't allow it, and it didn't arrive by sea or through tunnels. Did Israel turn a blind eye to its entry by land?

So what to do? There are good options, but because they're good, their chances of being realized are low.

To understand these options, one must understand how we got here. The main failure was in the war objective whispered between Netanyahu and Bezalel Smotrich to renew the momentum of settlements in Gaza. Since this was the real war objective, Netanyahu blocked the truly good option—bringing the Abraham Accords countries into Rafah to establish a government there competing with Hamas, which would replace it in due course.

Netanyahu's desire to keep Smotrich in the government led him to plant in him the illusion that renewing settlements is achievable. This is the real reason Netanyahu closed the Rafah crossing.

Reopening the crossing is the real test of Israel's sincerity in accepting Trump's outline, according to which the crossing should have been opened long ago. As long as the crossing is closed, Egypt and the Abraham Accords countries won't enter Rafah, and the settlement renewal project is as if alive and well, especially in an election year.

Establishing a government competing with Hamas that relies on Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and not on the tragic fiasco of the "clans"—with the assassination of Abu Shabab—is the real option that should have been established long ago, and positions Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Abraham Accords as partners for the day after Hamas. But the grandmaizer who wanted settlements brought us Turkey, and he still believes he'll get settlements.

Establishing a government competing with Hamas that relies on Egypt and Saudi Arabia and not on the tragic fiasco of the "clans" is the real option that should have been established long ago. But the grandmaster who wanted settlements brought us Turkey.

As for the expected meeting between Trump and Netanyahu, the need for Turkey at this stage is only because an international force is needed to break the ice in recruiting additional armies. Qatar has a role at this stage, as having influence over Hamas, but the big prize is Saudi Arabia. Small Qatar has tactical significance for this time, Saudi Arabia has strategic significance for the long term.

But Netanyahu's strategy is canceling the trial. That's the whole appearance. Will Trump give him what he wants? Will the meeting of conflicting interests produce an explosion, or the arrangement of strategic relations with the United States for the long term?

Pinchas Inbari is a senior Middle East researcher, journalist, author, screenwriter, and poet. Author of the entries on the Palestinians in the New Hebrew Encyclopedia. Served for many years as a researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He authored non-fiction books on the Palestinian issue and a linguistics book on the roots of the Hebrew language, "The Story of a Root." The novels he co-authored with his wife Aviva are: "On the Back of a Storm"—about the challenges of Christian communities in the Western Galilee during the British Mandate period facing radical Islam and women's status, and "The Borrowed Guardian," which deals with Israeli corruption.