Islamic Jihad ambush to IDF in Gaza

Political Analysis: Trump, Netanyahu, and Regional Arrangements

Now, after Hamas has given its positive response to the United States, President Trump will be able to announce, in the presence of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the end of the war in Gaza. However, this still involves a ceasefire agreement with a phased prisoner release, where Hamas is the party to the deal, not "the families" that Israel tried to bring in place of Hamas under the Gaza aid project.

President Trump is the one dictating the pace of events, and his tight schedule does not allow him time for our Prime Minister's tricks and maneuvers. This phased agreement is the last chance Trump is giving Netanyahu to organize his affairs domestically, in order to proceed to "regional arrangements."

On one hand, Trump understands that only Bibi can lead Trump's plans in Israel, because he was not impressed that the pale opposition would be able to stand up to the poison machine that Bibi would activate against regional moves from the opposition. It's better for Lapid, Gantz and their colleagues to be a supportive opposition rather than Bibi and the messianics as a sabotaging opposition.

The Regional Arrangements: Two Competing Tracks

When discussing "regional arrangements," we're talking about two opposing, non-complementary tracks: "The Syrian Track" and "The Expansion of the Abraham Accords" – namely, Saudi Arabia.

Currently, the wind is blowing toward Syria, but weekend events cast doubt on the feasibility of these arrangements. It turns out that IDF forces are increasingly penetrating deep into Syrian territory, mainly to the Daraa area and the Hermon slopes, to thwart attacks against Golan settlements by terror cells that Iran is trying to form within Syria.

It appears that even after losing Syria, Iran is still trying to harm Israel through terror cells – like those of Hamas in Hebron and Jenin, Islamic Jihad in Gaza, and the Houthis. Iran wants to come to negotiations with the United States with all the cards it has, however weak they may be.

The Syrian Dilemma

The question is whether Israel can rely on a Syrian regime that emerged from ISIS, based on Chechen, Uyghur and other "Zion enthusiasts" militias, who will guard the Golan border and oversee Israel from the heights of the Golan.

According to Abu Mohammad al-Julani's situation, he's quite similar to Abu Mazen in the West Bank. Outside the presidential palace and central Damascus, all the rest of Syrian territory is divided among Salafist militia leaders, and his great difficulty is deploying real rule over all of Syria, at least like he had in Idlib.

Additionally, Turkey and Iran have already informed him that they oppose any arrangement with Israel. Iran is still capable of establishing, from the remnants of Assad's regime, cells that will cause problems for Julani both domestically and against Israel, and in continuing support for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Regarding Turkey, his situation is much more difficult. On one hand, Turkish intelligence rushed to deploy in Syria and has a strong grip on Julani's throat. Erdogan is angry with Julani because instead of advancing plans for renewing the Ottoman Caliphate, he's going in circles – with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, with Europe and Trump, and now with Israel.

The irony is that precisely what's called the Air Force arch over Syria that so bothers Erdogan – precisely a security agreement with Israel that would stop Air Force activity in Syria – might advance Erdogan's plans.

The Air Force Factor

The Air Force arch is what opened the skies for victory over Iran, but also blocks Turkey in its southern race to Al-Aqsa Mosque. This Air Force activity is supposed to be at the center of arrangements with Syria in the discussed agreement.

When examining what the agreement with Syria is really about, it's more or less a renewal of the separation of forces agreements that Israel signed with Hafez al-Assad after the Yom Kippur War. It will have to give up the Syrian Hermon, its deep penetrations into Syria, and Air Force activity.

What does this mean regarding the messages given to the Druze? Can Israel really come down from the Syrian Hermon? Assad's regime was able to maintain its part in the separation of forces agreements – will Julani and his Chechens be able to do the same? Do separation of forces agreements with Syria have what it takes to give Trump the Nobel Prize?

The Saudi Option

This brings us back to the Saudi option. I suspect that Trump's entire direction toward Syria stemmed from the Saudis, to exempt themselves from getting closer to Bibi and his scorpion's sting. But, as we see, they, together with France, are not giving up on the Gaza aid plan for the day after the war.

In this matter, Saudi Arabia has fundamental disagreements with Qatar. While Qatar insists that in any day-after arrangement, Hamas will keep its weapons as a symbol of continuing "resistance," Saudi Arabia agrees that Hamas will remain, but without its weapons. Only after rehabilitation of a mechanism that will disarm Hamas, with its consent, will Saudi Arabia be able to channel its economic capabilities to Gaza's rehabilitation and replace Hamas's jihadist regime with another civil one.

These disagreements also created disagreements within Hamas. Palestinian sources reported to us that al-Hayya and his Gaza colleagues are lashing out at Hamas's "Qatari" leadership, saying they don't care about the fate of the Gazans.

Part of the delay in Hamas's response stemmed from these internal difficulties.

The Critical Choice

So, if on one hand, the difficulties in an agreement with Syria are becoming increasingly clear, and it turns out there's no escape from going for the big prize – an agreement with Saudi Arabia – Bibi needs to decide if he continues with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich.

Saudi Arabia has made it unequivocally clear that it will not approach the Israeli government in its current composition. It will initially demand guarantees from Trump that Bibi won't sting it, but that's only after he removes the two troublemakers from his government.

The Gaza Strategy Dispute

In the last government meeting before the flight to the United States, it was published that Netanyahu demanded the IDF continue the war with a new war objective – to move the remaining Gazans from the north of the Strip southward. It was reported that Chief of Staff Zamir refused.

Bibi understands that these day-after plans are pie in the sky, and his publicized quarrel with Chief of Staff Zamir is intended to keep the government until he returns from the White House, so that the question of Gaza's day-after doesn't become, earlier than expected, the day after Netanyahu's government.