Now that the war with Iran is behind us, we must turn our attention to a new danger that demands our focus—Turkey. To understand the threat from Turkey, we must first comprehend what is happening in Syria.

The Battle for Syria's Identity

At its core, the struggle over Syria is between Saudi Arabia and "the Arabs" on one side, and Turkey and Qatar with "the Muslims" on the other, over Syria's fundamental definition—whether it is an "Arab" state or a "Muslim" state.

Saudi Arabia is pushing with all its might for the Middle East to return to being Arab, as it was before the great upheaval that shook it and introduced many foreigners, particularly to Syria and Iraq. Mujahideen from all corners of the world, especially in Syria, have taken the place of Arabs who fled.

When Bashar al-Assad was negotiating his return to the Arab League, Saudi Arabia set a condition for the return of Syrian refugees to their homeland. He promised, of course, but did not deliver. Consequently, Saudi Arabia withdrew its support. Now, with the rise of Abu Mohammad al-Julani, Saudi Arabia, in its contacts with him, again insisted on defining Syria as an Arab state. Julani promised, but his source of power is Qatar's money and Turkey's backing.

Since he failed to overcome the militias whose support enabled his entry into Damascus, he followed Turkey and Qatar's line, incorporating into what is called the Syrian army many foreigners—Chechens, Chinese Uyghurs, and others with ISIS backgrounds. According to Syrian opposition leader Kamal Labwani, the ISIS-like spirit prevailing in Syria led to the severe attack on the Orthodox church in central Damascus.

The Christian Dilemma

Defining Syria as an Arab state provided some protection for "Arab" Christians, but the "Muslim" definition leaves them exposed.

The defence of Arab identity in the Middle East against Qatar and Turkey's efforts to Islamize it has also penetrated the Shiite world. In Lebanon, immediately after Hezbollah enlisted in Iran's effort to preserve Bashar al-Assad, central Shiite forces emerged, such as Sheikh Subhi Tufayli, former Hezbollah Secretary-General, who opposed the Shiites being dragged after Iran. Similar phenomena arose among Iraqi Shiites, who refused to give precedence in Shiism to the Persian University of Qom instead of Najaf and Karbala, which are the true heart of Shiism—and they are Arab.

Now, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem's refusal to assist Iran in its hour of need completes the circle, with Hezbollah aligning with the Arab Lebanese state rather than remaining within Iran's proxy framework.

It is no coincidence that Saudi Arabia is financing the reconstruction of Arab Lebanon, while Qatar is strengthening Muslim Syria.

Israel's Strategic Choice

This raises the question: which side does Israel stand with—Qatar, with "Muslim" Julani, or with the Syrian "Arab" underground in exile?

Unfortunately, Israel is aligning with Qatar and "the Muslims," not with Saudi Arabia and "the Arabs," thereby bringing ISIS and Turkey closer to its borders. Israel's support for the Druze of southern Syria may prove insufficient after Julani's Muslim militia army gains strength. What we saw at the Orthodox church in Damascus and the Alawite massacre could, God forbid, move southward.

Erdoğan frequently speaks recently about not allowing (Israel) to divide Syria into a new Sykes-Picot. He primarily means the Kurds threatening Turkey's own integrity, but also the formation of a Druze region aligned with Israel.

The Cost of Strategic Misalignment

Perhaps the time has come for damage control regarding Netanyahu's decision to prefer Qatar over Saudi Arabia as Israel's primary Middle Eastern ally.

We all remember how, in the middle of last year, the entire Middle East mobilized to defend Israel during the major missile and drone attack. Iran launched 200 missiles and drones toward us that were intercepted in a joint effort by Israel, the United States, Britain, and most importantly: Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Jordan—largely over Jordan by the Jordanian army. The damage from this concentrated attack was minimal.

This could have been the launching point for Israel's Middle Eastern alliance with "the Arabs." Saudi Arabia set two conditions that were good for Israel but bad for the government: concrete progress on the Palestinian issue and the removal of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich from the government. On the Palestinian matter, Saudi Arabia does not include Abu Mazen in any initiative, so all talk of a Palestinian state is lip service due to the harsh impression of the Gaza war on the Arab public throughout the region.

Israel's response was closing the Rafah crossing, effectively removing Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states from Gaza. Netanyahu chose Ben-Gvir over bin Salman. The question arises: didn't the massive damage Israel suffered in subsequent Iranian missile attacks stem from that choice? What Israel could have accomplished when the entire Arab Middle East stood beside it, it could not achieve when left alone. American aid proved insufficient.

Military Strategic Implications

Moreover, suppose Israeli Air Force jets had operated from Saudi bases rather than the Negev—couldn't they have reached much deeper ranges in Iran, and faster? Would the entire Fordow affair have looked different?

And what about Israel's entire image in the world—fighting with the Arabs rather than against them?

The war against Iran may not be over, and we might need additional rounds. Wouldn't it be preferable to face Iran from within Saudi Arabia and together with Saudi Arabia, rather than being dependent on Qatari "mediation"—Iran's ally?

Erdoğan's Strategic Vision

This scenario is Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan's worst nightmare, as evidenced in his speech delivered about a week ago in Istanbul at the Islamic Cooperation Conference. Essentially, he extended cooperation to "Muslim" Iran while ignoring "Arabness."

In subtext, in an unspoken message, stood Erdoğan's inability to accept Israel as a regional power. In his Muslim culture, he can accept the historical equation of Sunni Ottomans fighting Shiite Persia, but he cannot digest that the inferior Jews, Islam's protected people, are the regional power. It's difficult for him to accept that those standing in the way of renewing the Ottoman Caliphate are Jews controlling Syrian skies. If it were Iran—intellectually and practically difficult; if it's the Jews—emotionally unbearable.

The Al-Aqsa Strategy

Given this, we must be wary of ministers' boastful statements of all kinds. Perhaps we should let actions speak rather than press releases? restraint is also strength—perhaps more than boasting.

However, not only the subtext is troubling, but also the text itself. What must be noted is that he again placed Al-Aqsa Mosque at the forefront of his concern, establishing the mosque's liberation as the Muslim world's goal under his leadership. Remember Julani's militias' declarations the day they entered the Great Umayyad Mosque in Damascus? They said: "From here to Al-Aqsa!" This is exactly what Erdoğan said.

But there's something else to note. What Julani's militias also said that day—that after Al-Aqsa, they would liberate Mecca.

In his Istanbul speech, when addressing the "Muslim" powers he seeks to unite, he did mention Saudi Arabia favorably for its efforts regarding Gaza, but embedded dangerous messages to Saudi Arabia in all other messages—and they understood these messages well.

The Mecca Challenge

When listing Islam's important cities, he ignored Mecca, mentioning only Medina alongside Damascus, Jakarta, etc. When crowning Al-Aqsa, he used Muslim Brotherhood terminology calling it "the first qibla"—meaning the first prayer direction, superior to Mecca, because Jerusalem was first chosen as Muslims' prayer direction before Mecca, which is the second qibla.

The Saudis have a different definition of Jerusalem as "the third after the two Harams"—meaning Jerusalem's status comes only after Mecca and Medina, and Al-Aqsa Mosque is not a Haram—meaning it's a regular mosque without the special status of Haram, which is a mosque of exceptional importance. There are only two such mosques: Mecca and Medina.

From Erdoğan's perspective, Jerusalem's special status in his eyes is not only against Israel but also against Mecca's primacy.

Israel's Dangerous Game

But Israel remains attached to Qatar, and this connection exposes Israel to additional danger. Benjamin Netanyahu allows Ben-Gvir to make his provocations on the Temple Mount, and this is exactly what Erdoğan needs to unite the Muslim world against Israel and Saudi Arabia.

From recently published records from Sinwar's archive, the Hamas leader explicitly identified Ben-Gvir's provocations as a factor he could not ignore. "Al-Aqsa Flood" is a name that was not chosen randomly but as a brand to unite all arenas against Israel.

This is exactly what Erdoğan is saying now. We should fear that Erdoğan's Al-Aqsa flood won't be one of flip-flops.

Saudi Arabia awaits new status quo arrangements on the Temple Mount to curb Turkey, but Erdoğan waits for Ben-Gvir to unite Islam and break forward to liberate Al-Aqsa with an upgraded Al-Aqsa Flood.