s

After the United States' entry into the war, what remains of Iran's nuclear program is the enriched uranium that the regime is hiding, and until this material is handed over, Iran's war cannot be considered complete. According to unconfirmed reports, this material was destroyed in Isfahan, but there is no certainty about the veracity of these reports.

It's doubtful whether Iran, under current conditions, can produce a bomb from this material, but it could serve terrorist purposes as dirty bombs. Therefore, the formula on the table is: the material in exchange for the regime. The Ayatollahs can preserve their regime only in exchange for handing over this material to an external body, such as Putin, or providing reliable information about whether it was destroyed or not.

Iran responded with an attack on Israel, causing significant damage and casualties, after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi accused the United States of violating the UN charter. This suggests that in the context of the United States, Iran will turn to the UN channel, or at least this is the position of part of the Iranian leadership.

Will Iran's response be an escalation of the confrontation with Israel, versus a response against the United States at the UN – meaning no retaliation? We will know soon.

If Iran indeed swallows the American blow but escalates the war with Israel, it could create Israeli-American disagreement regarding war objectives. Israel will aim at escalating in the direction of regime change, but the United States will have an interest in preserving the regime, not only to ensure the delivery of the dangerous enriched material, but also because of America's global relationships, especially with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, China, and Russia.

If the dangerous material was indeed destroyed, Iran will have to provide proof that this happened in order to reach an agreement with the powers.

The Ayatollahs' dilemma is giving up nuclear capability, including the enriched material, in exchange for preserving the regime. This doesn't mean the Ayatollahs will actually maintain their power, but that remains for the Iranian people to decide, and there's a good chance that the Iranians themselves will overthrow this regime of terror.

After the United States entered the war, Israel must coordinate its war objectives with those of the United States, and the main possible disagreement is regime change. The United States is interested in keeping Iran as an address, at least until the hidden material issue is resolved, while in Israel they talk about eliminating Khamenei and regime change – matters that the United States is not interested in, because they have the potential for entanglement in a real war against Iran beyond the air strike against oil facilities.

Will Iran attack American targets in the region? It's hard to know. On one hand, there's the honour culture of the Ayatollahs, but on the other hand, there's Persian pragmatism. The Ayatollahs are religious zealots, and the Persians are bazaar merchants. Who will prevail? We will know soon.

Attention should be paid to China. It has a clear interest in Gulf stability, because its economy depends on Iranian oil. The Ayatollahs must carefully consider whether to harm their best ally. Reports from Russia spoke of Chinese aircraft flying over Turkmenistan in radio silence. Did they supply military equipment to Iran? Unknown, but now if China demands that the Ayatollahs not close the Strait of Hormuz, they will have to listen.

As for Russia, Putin is losing an ally for the war in Ukraine, but he seems indifferent. He's willing “to contribute ideas to end the crisis”, but not beyond that.

There is, of course, also great danger to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The demonstration of American power could reassure them, but they are also aware of the danger that pressure in the United States on Trump is still heavy not to get entangled in a war with Iran beyond the blows it has dealt to Iran.

The weakness of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf is the opening for a future Israeli-Arab alliance, which is the real game changer in the Middle East, but the problem is Israel's government relying on Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, whom Saudi Arabia cannot approach Israel while these two are the ruling factor in its government.

Will the United States demand that Israel create the conditions for a Middle Eastern alliance, meaning: give up the services of these two in favour of establishing a normal government in Israel?

This matter has importance because of a new powerful Middle Eastern factor that will also find it difficult to accept the new reality – Turkey.

Over the weekend, Turkey's president , Erdogan, appeared in a particularly harsh speech against Israel, and he again raised the defense of Al-Aqsa Mosque to the top of the Turkish agenda.

The triangular of Turkey, Syria, and Israel deserves separate discussion, which we will address later, but the issue of Ben-Gvir's riots and his hilltop youth in the Old City and Temple Mount, which triggered Hamas's Al-Aqsa Flood, could arouse Erdoğan as the defender of Islam's holy places in Jerusalem- and that's a completely new story.

Now that the original goals of the war have been achieved, and Turkey is on the horizon as a new strategic challenge, and the United States has emerged as the one that can lead the confrontation with Iran in its global contexts, perhaps it is time for Israel to consider ending the war.