The weekend's most significant development was the White House announcement that a decision on striking Fordow will be made within two weeks—suggesting the scales are tipping toward the United States not participating in the war. Assuming this isn't a deception exercise, and the US won't surprise with an attack, Israel remains alone in the campaign. This isn't necessarily bad, as the scales are leaning toward a political arrangement, or Israel acting alone against Fordow—which also has advantages alongside risks.

Israeli experts say it's impossible, but we've seen ingenuity and imaginative capabilities in this war that don't rule out Israeli ability to damage Fordow as well. Perhaps not destruction, but sufficient damage.

What preceded the White House announcement was an Iranian delegation's arrival in Oman, meaning that in these very days, there are direct negotiations between the United States—namely Witkoff via Zoom—and Iran on a new nuclear agreement. Iran is conducting negotiations under fire and under conditions of uncertainty about whether Trump will join the war or not.

What's at stake? Iranian renunciation of nuclear weapons versus an Iranian demand for nuclear development for peaceful purposes. To enable such a formula, Iran must accept an effective and robust oversight mechanism by the International Atomic Energy Agency, without the deception exercises Iran has specialized in until now. Most importantly, Iran must surrender the material it has already produced for bomb purposes, which is assumed to be hidden somewhere.

This demand places Iranian leadership before a dilemma: the bomb or the regime. If they insist on claiming they have no fissile material—they risk the regime. Above the Iranians hangs the sword of Khamenei's elimination. In my opinion, despite Defense Minister Katz's fiery messaging, Khamenei won't be eliminated until we know whether Iran will transfer the fissile material to an entity outside its borders. Putin?

Before Iranian leadership's eyes stand the fates of Nasrallah and Saddam Hussein, and how the elimination of leaders brought down their regimes. Will others' experience influence Iranian decisions? I personally think yes, therefore I believe there's a high chance for the political option to prevail over the military option in White House considerations.

Supporting the political option are China's considerations. Iranian oil is a cornerstone of the Chinese economy, as it imports most of this oil. It will do everything to bring about a political solution. If Israel had a foreign ministry, Israel should be in the midst of persuasion efforts in China, that precisely dismantling Iran's nuclear capabilities would stabilize the situation in the Arab Gulf and guarantee China stable fuel supply over time.

But the Chinese are smart enough to understand this alone. After initial reports from Russia that Chinese aircraft passed over Turkmenistan skies with silent  radio, raising concerns that China was about to change its global policy of not being militarily involved far from its borders, came a sigh of relief. The Chinese Foreign Ministry contacted foreign ministries in the Arab world to ensure China's involvement would be diplomatic only.

In the immediate context, this means the Strait of Hormuz at the edge of the Persian Gulf won't be blocked, and in the broader context that Israel won't ignite oil facilities. Therefore, one can hope there's also very heavy Chinese leverage on Iran, not only to end the war but also to dismantle the nuclear program. If no such leverage exists, Israeli diplomacy must ensure this happens.

The meaning of these things is that Israel—contrary to Defense Minister Katz's bellicose messaging—won't work to topple the regime, because as much as we need China's help, and as much as we understand that Witkoff also needs an address to complete negotiations, the ayatollahs' regime remains. If it falls, that's in the hands of the Iranian people, not Defence Minister Katz.

Paradoxically, ending the war actually increases chances of toppling the regime, since under Israeli bombardments, the masses can't flood the streets, and only after the skies no longer threaten—will the threat from within open against the regime.

Israel isn't a partner in all contacts for a political arrangement, because the world has already internalized that decision-making in Israel is infected by Netanyahu's personal considerations, and everyone is attentive to Defense Minister Katz's strange declarations. No international actor is prepared to have its fate depend on the legal considerations of Israel's prime minister and his judicial overhaul. Hence, it should be assessed that once there's an agreement between the United States and Iran, it will be imposed on Israel.

If the agreement ensures Iran's dismantling from nuclear capabilities, surrender of fissile material already prepared to an external entity, and activation of an effective and real oversight mechanism by the International Atomic Energy Agency over the cunning ayatollahs—then a satisfactory solution can be presented to Israel.

If not—Israel must complete the work alone. Had it been in an alliance with Saudi Arabia today, it could have launched an attack from effective range, but it chose not to. If it does the work alone, in the equation of its relations with the United States, the scales will tip toward balance—which will increase its prestige but could complicate relations with China, and if it endangers the Gulf—also relations with them.

What's clear is that without cancelling Iran's nuclear capabilities, the war cannot end. An agreement is preferable, and it's preferable that the United States strike Fordow, but if not—Israel isn't helpless. We have someone to rely on—the air force in the skies.