The effort to establish the Morag axis is not new. It was first proposed at the beginning of the war when Egypt, the Abraham Accords countries, as well as Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, had already entered through the Rafah crossing into the southern Gaza Strip. Their aim was to establish an alternative regime to Hamas, which would gradually expand northward — similar to the Idlib enclave model in Syria — until it completely replaced Hamas with a new government connected to Egypt and the Abraham Accords countries. This would serve as the foundation for creating an "Arab NATO" together with Israel, forming an alliance to advance the war against common enemies: Iran and Yemen.

The plan was to concentrate Gazans in the area adjacent to the Philadelphi Corridor and create a parallel route in what is today called the Morag axis. This was one of the reasons why the IDF did not immediately descend on Rafah, but instead allowed alternative aid to UNRWA to organize near the Philadelphi Corridor. The Morag axis was intended to separate the south from the north to ensure that smuggling from the Philadelphi Corridor would not reach northward.

However, Netanyahu, as is known, decided on "total victory" linked to capturing the Philadelphi Corridor and destroying Rafah. From what we know about "Qatargate," Israel was not interested in creating an alternative to Hamas but rather in maintaining Qatar's influence in Gaza without competition from Egypt and the Abraham Accords countries. The IDF then moved south, captured the Philadelphi Corridor, closed the Rafah crossing, and blocked Egypt and its allies from any possibility of creating an alternative to Hamas.

Is the capture of the Morag axis intended to revive the original plan of establishing an alternative government to Hamas in the southern Gaza Strip? Absolutely not.

We are in a period where Israel's intentions cannot be analyzed based on its national interests; everything is subject to Netanyahu's personal considerations and coalition calculations.

The renewal of intense fighting was designed to stabilize his government and pass the budget. These were the demands of those exempt from military service, like Ben Gvir, and those with shortened service, like the "job-seeker" Smotrich (with no information about his reserve service). Now that his government has been stabilized, we can expect a renewal of diplomatic initiatives. At least, that's what U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff could expect, but he, like many others, repeatedly falls into Netanyahu's sophisticated traps. Whitkoff gave him an opportunity to pass the budget and proceed to negotiations for the return of all hostages after a symbolic extension of Phase One. However, he did not take into account that the military pressure on Hamas would not be tactical but could be part of promises to Netanyahu's coalition, primarily the return to Gush Katif in addition to a new settlement bloc in northern Gaza.

But can Netanyahu fulfill his promises to Smotrich (settlements) and Ben Gvir (intense warfare)? There is serious doubt. In a very unusual move, President Trump called President Sisi to extend Eid al-Fitr greetings, and Arab media reported that they also discussed Gaza and the Yemen crisis.

Next month, Trump travels to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is willing to invest enormous sums in the American economy. They want to end the war in Gaza. Trump has committed to the release of all hostages. So not everything is bad.