The Renewal of Fighting in Gaza

The resumption of military operations in Gaza is multidimensional and cannot be understood solely through the direct lens of Israel's struggle against Hamas. I would argue that the Israeli-Hamas confrontation is perhaps the least important aspect of the renewed conflict.

Israel justified the resumption of war as necessary pressure on Hamas to accept the Witkoff proposal, according to Israel's version—to release 11 hostages. However, Witkoff has not detailed his proposal. Nevertheless, he blamed Hamas for rejecting his plan and warned that Hamas would face consequences similar to what the Houthis in Yemen are experiencing—powerful American attacks. In other words: the U.S. is going along with Netanyahu's claim that "Hamas is to blame," even though it was Netanyahu who violated the ceasefire agreement and halted the hostage release process.

Why? The United States understands that Israel lacks an opposition that could currently replace Netanyahu, and to implement U.S. policy, they need Netanyahu in a leadership position because, from outside the government, he would sabotage any initiative.

Additionally, it appears that during his recent visit with Trump, the two "tuned their instruments," and all the talk about the "deep state" that Netanyahu is now raising employs expressions taken from Trump's lexicon. Netanyahu hopes Trump will appreciate someone who echoes his rhetoric. So far, it's working.

Netanyahu is bombing Gaza while Trump is bombing Yemen. The question is for how long, and what each wants to achieve. Trump wants to take cards from Iran ahead of negotiations for a new nuclear agreement. Netanyahu wants to pass a budget and use the war in Gaza as a spin for the real war—completely changing Israel's governance system under the cover of Gaza's artillery thunder, including firing the Shin Bet chief to establish a "Securitate" or "Mukhabarat," and ousting the Attorney General.

Netanyahu's test will come on the day he passes the budget and stabilizes his government. Then, Wittkopf will reveal his true plan, which remains what it was before—ending the war according to the Bohler-Hayya framework.

Two pillars of the government, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, suspect that once Netanyahu stabilizes his government, he will return to talks with Hamas to end the war. If that's what Trump wants—Netanyahu will have to return the favor, with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich in his pocket.

This is why Netanyahu says that from now on, talks with Hamas will be conducted under fire. This isn't meant to convince Hamas, but Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. Similarly, all reports from the Prime Minister's direction that the IDF will take responsibility for aid distribution to Gazans when it resumes—and it will resume—are intended to signal to Smotrich that military governance is returning, along with the renewal of settlements in Gaza.

It seems Netanyahu decided to return to war earlier when he saw Hamas's outrageous ceremonies mocking him and portraying him as Dracula. He wasn't as concerned with the humiliation of our children as with his own humiliation.

All this aligned with the green light he received from Trump to put his affairs in order and stabilize his government.

When we examine what's actually happening in Gaza, we don't see a full-scale war as the Israeli media inflates it. These are primarily air attacks, with careful advancement on the Strip's periphery in areas that Israel wants to maintain as security zones  and the Netzarim axis.  Is it for good, or just to prove seriousness to Ben-Gvir and Smotrich? We will be able to see that after the budget.

But what deserves particular attention is the nature of the eliminations carried out by the Air Force: they included many political figures and officials alongside terrorists. One could say there was a focus on eliminating Hayya’s potential to establish a civilian Hamas government in the aftermath, according to Bohler's framework.

Khalil Hayya is not Qatar's man but belongs to Gaza's own political leadership. Positioning him as Gaza's next leader who would transform Hamas into a political party that would allow international forces to remove Hamas weapons from tunnels does not align with Qatar's plans. Qatar as a leading power of Moslem Brothers cannot allow any end of the Muqawama.

At the preparatory meeting in Riyadh, the polar positions of Saudi Arabia and Qatar collided—Saudi Arabia rejected any possibility of an armed Hamas in Gaza, while Qatar demanded preserving the "Muqawama" (resistance) at all costs. Egypt stated it would not disarm Hamas, so bin Salman decided to boycott the "day after" conference in Cairo.

Thus, the Bohler-Hayya framework contradicts Qatar's position and aligns with Saudi Arabia's.

Was Netanyahu's strike against the infrastructure that could serve Hayya in the aftermath intended to advance Qatar's interests?

Who? Netanyahu? Him? Impossible!