From reports coming out of Doha, it's becoming clear that the dialogue between the United States and Hamas is at the center of discussions. Although Witkoff isn't sitting face-to-face with Hyya, he doesn't need to—the entire Hamas leadership is there, alongside representatives of Islamic Jihad, and they are at the core of the negotiations. The weakened Israeli delegation and Abu Mazen's envoy, Hussein al-Sheikh, remain on the margins of the discussions, if they're involved at all.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are completely absent from the talks, the significance of which we'll address in a later blog.

So what exactly are the United States and Hamas discussing? How to reach Phase B and end the war in a way that allows Netanyahu to overcome his coalition crisis and other problems by the end of the month, while keeping the hope of releasing the hostages alive.

Until now, according to available information, Hamas claims it has an agreement that Israel is violating, and that it's time to evacuate the Philadelphi Corridor and open the Rafah crossing. The United States is proposing to establish a "bridging period" between the end of Phase A and the beginning of talks on Phase B—essentially, the end of the war. Israel's contribution to the US-Hamas dialogue is that this bridging period should extend for two months, not just until the end of the month. Why two months? Because any delay is considered beneficial.

Meanwhile, Witkoff left to address the Ukraine crisis, and upon his return, it's expected that if Hamas shows flexibility, they will demand the renewal of aid and the opening of the Rafah crossing.

Egypt had an opportunity to present its framework to Witkoff, and according to Arab press, Witkoff listened attentively. The result was that Trump withdrew his demand for Egypt to absorb evacuated Gaza residents.

Unlike the versions published about the Bohler-Hayya framework, according to which Hamas would agree to an Arab-international force entering Gaza to collect Hamas weapons, the Egyptian proposal suggests that Egypt and Jordan would train Gazan forces (in Sinai?) to enter Gaza and replace the Palestinian police, while Hamas would keep its weapons. The reason: there is no force in the world that could convince Egypt to enter Gaza. And the only force capable of fulfilling the role that Hayya proposed is Egypt, and he likely didn't consult with them about it.

This is Hussein al-Sheikh's role—to tug at Witkoff's sleeve: "Hey, we're here too!" So far, this isn't making an impression on anyone, as Abu Mazen continues to oppose the Egyptian framework where the Palestinian Authority and Hamas together would give their blessing to a temporary committee of non-organizational figures to govern Gaza. Abu Mazen wants the Authority to return to Gaza. Period. But all the negotiating parties are putting a comma after Abu Mazen's period.

Currently, Witkoff doesn't agree with Egypt's position that Hamas should keep its weapons during the interim period. The moment he agrees—that would be a major defeat for the government of "brave lions." Perhaps that's why Israel wants to extend the "bridge" to two months.

We should also consider why Saudi Arabia is ignoring the Doha talks. The bottom line—Saudi Arabia sees Qatar as an enemy and won't participate in any Qatari initiative. But the issues run much deeper—more on that in a separate occasion.