"Soon after October 7th, I was invited to a panel on a major television program where I suggested that we should immediately make an 'all-for-all' deal. I believe I was the first to propose this.

When the opinionated host looked at me in astonishment, I explained that we are not obligated to honor promises made to Hamas. First, we would receive our hostages to heal our wounds, empty the prisons into a future killing zone, and the war with Hamas wouldn't go anywhere – this is a long-term war. From the host's expression, I understood that I had ended my career with her panel, which freed up quality time for creative work.

Now, let's imagine what would have happened if we had a government that truly cared about the state rather than its constituent sectors, and what we would have done.

However, the government naturally didn't pursue this path, as the deepening division in the nation actually suited its agenda. It had different war objectives: expelling Gazans to Egypt and building settlements in Gaza. Releasing dangerous terrorists to the West Bank wouldn't have passed muster with Smotrich and Ben Gvir.

The real reason the government delayed moving to the Philadelphi Corridor was that it hoped Gazans would cross the border into Egypt and didn't want to block them. Ben Gvir's declarations triggered red alerts in Egypt, which quickly raised barriers to block this "voluntary" transfer.

When it became clear that expulsion to Egypt wasn't feasible, Netanyahu discovered "total victory" and closed the Rafah crossing, leaving Kerem Shalom as the only passage through which Qatar transferred diesel to hospitals under humanitarian grounds, though there are concerns about large quantities of gasoline disappearing into Hamas tunnels.

The closure of the Rafah crossing also eliminated the entry of aid from Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and the UAE from the southern Strip. These were supposed to form a kind of positive Idlib, where a nucleus replacement for Hamas could organize and later expand northward.

In my discussions with Arab sources opposing Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, they indicated that forces willing to create an alternative to Hamas need Palestinian Authority legitimacy to gain Arab world acceptance. This model replacing Hamas could later expand to the West Bank, but only after succeeding in Gaza, with Israeli assurance of allowing the model's expansion to the West Bank.

Beyond the economic aspect, there's the crucial educational component. The UAE has a curriculum promoting religious tolerance and opposing jihad, while Indonesia's curriculum is secular, with religious enrichment emphasizing personal potential rather than building a jihadist society.

None of this materialized, but we can dream, and perhaps there will be another opportunity in the future.

Unfortunately, President Trump has revived the transfer concept, which will only complicate his main objective of establishing a Saudi-Israeli alliance. Now, instead of focusing on the greater goal of integrating Israel into the Middle East as a united front against Iran, we'll have to quarrel with our future allies over an issue contrary to our interests.

Why? Gazan migration to Jordan would shake the kingdom's fragile demographics, returning Palestinians to majority status, which the Bedouins won't accept.

Even Palestinians in Jordan would oppose this, as their aim is to integrate into Jordan, and given Bedouin suspicion and the addition of Hamas-indoctrinated Gazans, this is definitely not what they want.

Moreover, Jordan itself distinguishes between West Bank Palestinians, who have a "national number" (akin to permanent residency), and Gazans, who have no civil status.

Regarding Egypt, it's embroiled in a struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood. Gazans who stayed in Egypt during the Arab Spring immediately sided with the Muslim Brotherhood against the government, playing a crucial role in prison raids to free Brotherhood prisoners, who later proved instrumental in ousting Mubarak and crowning Morsi as Cairo's first Muslim Brotherhood president. Sisi has no reason to renew this danger by flooding Egypt with jihadist-indoctrinated Gazans.

Concentrating Gazans in Sinai isn't helpful either, as it would open the Sinai border to a terror front and revive Hamas connections with Bedouin tribes, threatening both Egypt and Eilat.

Egypt is renewing war threats against Israel, and King Abdullah has said that transfer to Jordan is a "red line" that could serve as a casus belli.

It's worth remembering that Gulf states already expelled Palestinians for supporting Saddam Hussein, and even Iraqis expelled them to Syria and Turkey after Saddam's fall. No Arab state appears eager to accept them. One could say that Arabs love the Palestinian cause but not the Palestinians themselves.

So, because of a vision that contradicts Israel's interests, instead of building a Middle Eastern alliance, we'll have to prepare for dangers on new fronts.

However, the current reality of millions of Gazans crowded in a bottlenecked territory is also terrible and inhumane. The issue isn't about moving them from place to place, but their lack of freedom of movement in and out of Gaza by choice.

I previously discussed with Arab sources the possibility of building a port in Gaza as an opening for humanitarian aid and basic economic conditions, where individuals could decide whether to leave or enter Gaza, like any world citizen. I was told this could work provided Israel doesn't control the port. If we're talking about replacing Hamas with moderate Arab states and Indonesia…

So perhaps instead of indulging in harmful fantasies, we should simply build a port and bring redemption to Gaza."